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ABSTRACT 
 
The applications based on social networking have brought revolution 
towards social life and are continuously gaining popularity among the 
Internet users. Due to the advanced computational resources offered 
by the innovative hardware and nominal subscriber charges of 
network operators, most of the online social networks are 
transforming into the mobile domain by offering exciting applications 
and games exclusively designed for users on the go. Moreover, the 
mobile devices are considered more personal as compared to their 
desktop rivals, so there is a tendency among the mobile users to store 
sensitive data like contacts, passwords, bank account details, updated 
calendar entries with key dates and personal notes on their devices. 
The Project Social Wireless Network Secure Identification (SWIN) is 
carried out at Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS) to 
explore the practicality of providing the secure mobile social 
networking portal with advanced security features to tackle potential 
security threats by extending the existing methods with more 
innovative security technologies. In addition to the extensive 
background study and the determination of marketable use-cases with 
their corresponding security requirements, this thesis proposes a 
secure identification design to satisfy the security dimensions for both 
online and offline peers. We have implemented an initial prototype 
using PHP Socket and OpenSSL library to simulate the secure 
identification procedure based on the proposed design. The design is 
in compliance with 3GPP‟s Generic Authentication Architecture 
(GAA) and our implementation has demonstrated the flexibility of the 
solution to be applied independently for the applications requiring 
secure identification. Finally, the thesis provides strong foundation for 
the advanced implementation on mobile platform in future.    
 
Keywords: Secure Identification, Internet Security, GBA, UICC
 
  2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First of all, thanks to Almighty, the most beneficial and merciful. It was not possible 
without blessings of The Creator and his Messenger (PBUH). 
 
I would especially like to gratitude Mr. Christian Gehrmann for intense efforts and 
support in terms of resources and thorough guidance within this study. He really 
pushed and strengthened me whenever I get lost during the work. Furthermore, salute 
to his patience during the later part of this project. 
  
This thesis would never have been completed without the help of Mr. Markus Fiedler 
who always backed by reinforcing trust and motivated me throughout this study. 
 
Finally, dedication to my parents and family, especially to my mother who remains 
source of intuition for me and who always sacrificed for the further studies of her 
children. Thanks Dad for your encouragement and financial support in all my 
endeavors. 
 
  3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................... 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 3 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ 5 
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 7 
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 PROJECT SWIN .................................................................................................................... 10 
1.2 THESIS ORGANIZATION ........................................................................................................ 10 
1.3 PROBLEM DEFINITION .......................................................................................................... 10 
1.3.1 Originality....................................................................................................................... 11 
1.3.2 Scope of the thesis ........................................................................................................... 11 
1.3.3 Research Questions......................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................................... 12 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 12 
2 SECURE IDENTIFICATION ..................................................................................... 13 
2.1 USE-CASES .......................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1.1 Fashion Industry ............................................................................................................. 13 
2.1.2 Religious Factions .......................................................................................................... 14 
2.1.3 Business Network ............................................................................................................ 15 
2.2 USE CASE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.1 Business aspect ............................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Technological aspect ...................................................................................................... 18 
2.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................... 20 
2.3.1 Secure Registration and Authentication ......................................................................... 20 
2.3.2 Profiles and Location Based Services ............................................................................. 21 
2.3.3 Access Control and Data Storage ................................................................................... 21 
2.3.4 Managing real-time services........................................................................................... 21 
2.4 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 22 
3 STATE OF THE ART .................................................................................................. 23 
3.1 MOBILE SOCIAL NETWORKS ................................................................................................ 23 
3.1.1 Online Social Networks .................................................................................................. 23 
3.1.2 Social Networks in Mobile Domain ................................................................................ 24 
3.2 SECURE IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES...................................................................................... 26 
3.2.1 Secure routing schemes in Ad hoc networks using PKI .................................................. 26 
3.2.2 Symmetric and Layered approaches ............................................................................... 26 
3.2.3 Location Anonymity ........................................................................................................ 28 
3.3 KEY EXCHANGE SCHEMES ................................................................................................... 29 
3.3.1 Secure Identity Management and Sharing ...................................................................... 29 
3.3.2 Generic Authentication Architecture .............................................................................. 31 
3.3.3 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) ................................................................... 32 
3.3.4 Support for subscriber certificates (SSC) ....................................................................... 34 
3.3.5 SPKI and SDSI ................................................................................................................ 36 
3.3.6 Device Pairing ................................................................................................................ 36 
3.3.7 Manual Authentication Using MAC (MANA III) ............................................................ 37 
3.4 TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY (TLS) .................................................................................. 38 
3.4.1 TLS Handshake Protocol ................................................................................................ 39 
3.4.2 TLS Change Cipher Specs (CCS) ................................................................................... 40 
3.4.3 TLS Alert Protocol .......................................................................................................... 40 
  4 
3.4.4 TLS Record Protocol ...................................................................................................... 41 
3.5 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 41 
4 SECURE IDENTIFICATION DESIGN ..................................................................... 42 
4.1 ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................. 42 
4.1.1 Certificate Structure ....................................................................................................... 43 
4.1.2 Database Model .............................................................................................................. 43 
4.2 NETWORKING ELEMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS ................................................................... 44 
4.2.1 User Equipment .............................................................................................................. 44 
4.2.2 Bootstrapping server function (BSF) .............................................................................. 45 
4.2.3 PKI .................................................................................................................................. 45 
4.2.4 MSNP .............................................................................................................................. 45 
4.2.5 Reference point Zsn ........................................................................................................ 46 
4.2.6 Reference point Ub andUa ............................................................................................. 46 
4.2.7 Reference point Usn ........................................................................................................ 46 
4.3 KEY EXCHANGE SCHEME..................................................................................................... 46 
4.3.1 User Certificate Enrollment ............................................................................................ 47 
4.3.2 New registration and creation of new social group ........................................................ 47 
4.3.3 Secure authentication of registered users ....................................................................... 49 
4.3.4 Online invitation to new members .................................................................................. 50 
4.3.5 Joining procedure for user invited in online mode ......................................................... 51 
4.3.6 New group creation by already registered members ...................................................... 52 
4.4 SECURE IDENTIFICATION IN OFFLINE MODE ......................................................................... 52 
4.4.1 Offline invitation by moderator to non-registered user of group .................................... 52 
4.4.2 Offline authentication of users belonging to same group ............................................... 54 
4.5 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 54 
5 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................ 55 
5.1 PROTOTYPE STRUCTURE ...................................................................................................... 55 
5.1.1 Prototype Platform ......................................................................................................... 55 
5.1.2 Prototype Architecture .................................................................................................... 56 
5.2 SOFTWARE MODULES .......................................................................................................... 56 
5.2.1 PHP Sockets.................................................................................................................... 56 
5.2.2 PHP OpenSSL Module .................................................................................................... 56 
5.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 57 
5.3.1 Secure Connectivity ........................................................................................................ 57 
5.3.2 Potential Attack .............................................................................................................. 57 
5.4 MSNP PROTOTYPE RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 57 
5.4.1 Server Mode .................................................................................................................... 57 
5.4.2 Client Mode .................................................................................................................... 58 
5.5 DEMONSTRATION ................................................................................................................. 59 
5.5.1 Secure Registration ......................................................................................................... 59 
5.5.2 New Social Group and Online Invitation ........................................................................ 59 
5.5.3 Offline Authentication and Invitation ............................................................................. 61 
5.6 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 62 
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK .................................................................... 63 
6.1 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 63 
6.2 FUTURE WORK .................................................................................................................... 64 
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................................ 65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 75 
 
 
 
  5 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Fig. 1: Use Case diagram of business network .......................................................... 19 
Fig. 2: Kerberos version 5 based authentication scenario [31] .................................. 27 
Fig. 3: OpenID Authentication flow .......................................................................... 30 
Fig. 4: GAA Architecture ........................................................................................... 31 
Fig. 5: GBA network model with application server outside internal network [6] .... 32 
Fig. 6: Bootstrapping procedure [6] ........................................................................... 33 
Fig. 7: Reference model for issuance of certificates [42] .......................................... 34 
Fig. 8: Message flow for issuing certificate [42] ....................................................... 35 
Fig. 9: Device pairing using user verification scheme [48] ....................................... 36 
Fig. 10: Manual authentication using MAC [47] ....................................................... 38 
Fig. 11: TLS Protocol Stack [49] ............................................................................... 38 
Fig: 12: TLS Handshake Protocol [49] ...................................................................... 40 
Fig. 13: Simple model for mobile social network portal ........................................... 42 
Fig 14: Database model for MSNP secure identification module .............................. 43 
Fig. 15: New user registration flow ............................................................................ 48 
Fig. 16: Online invitation flow initiated by moderator .............................................. 50 
Fig. 17: Offline authentication procedure for non-registered users of particular group
 ............................................................................................................................ 53 
Fig. 18: Prototype Architecture .................................................................................. 56 
 
Figure A. 1: Home screen of thesis prototype ........................................................................ 65 
Figure A. 2: Generation of key pairs and certificates signing requests .................................. 65 
Figure A. 3: Download page for generated credentials .......................................................... 66 
Figure A. 4: Validating certificate request ............................................................................. 66 
Figure A. 5: New user registration ......................................................................................... 67 
Figure A. 6: Validating certificates and server key after secure registration .......................... 67 
Figure A. 7: Sign in page for registered user .......................................................................... 68 
Figure A. 8: View via download option of server public key ................................................. 68 
Figure A. 9: Page view after successful login ........................................................................ 69 
Figure A. 10: Page for creation of new social group .............................................................. 69 
Figure A. 11: Online invitation page ...................................................................................... 70 
Figure A. 12: Inviting another user to your social group ........................................................ 70 
Figure A. 13: Validating online invitation request ................................................................. 71 
Figure A. 14: Creating offline connection via sockets ........................................................... 71 
  6 
Figure A. 15: Validation of random numbers and sent vector via ViDP protocol ................. 72 
Figure A. 16: Validation of received certificate and invitation vector by other user ............. 72 
Figure A. 17: Invitation vector in encrypted form .................................................................. 73 
Figure A. 18: Getting online and joining social group via offline invitation ......................... 73 
Figure A. 19: Successful membership via credentials received in offline mode .................... 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement 
AP Authentication Proxy 
API Application Programming Interface 
AS Authentication Server 
AUTH-1 Authenticator 
BSF Bootstrapping Server Function 
CA Certificate Authority 
CSR Certificate Signing Request 
GAA Generic Authentication Architecture 
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 
GBA_ME ME-based GBA 
GBA_U GBA with UICC-based enhancements 
GUSS GBA User Security Settings 
HSS Home Subscriber System 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
LBS Location Based Services 
MNO Mobile Network Operator 
MSNP Mobile Social Networking Portal 
NAF Network Application Server 
NE Network Element 
OP OpenID Provider 
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
RP Relaying Party 
SA Security Association 
SSC Support for Subscriber Certificates 
SSO Single Sign-On Service 
TGS Ticket Granting Server 
TLS Transport Layer Security 
UE User Equipment 
  8 
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
USS User Security Setting 
VIP Verisign Identity Protection 
3GPP 3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  9 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Online social networking has brought revolution towards social life by facilitating 
interaction with old friends, sharing of events, distribution of data and various other 
aspects of social life. Due to the advanced computational resources offered by 
innovative hardware and nominal subscriber charges of the network operators, there 
has been an emerging trend among subscribers to access web-based services via 
mobile devices. The latest mobile based software also support ease of personalization 
as compared to their desktop rivals like change of language, settings etc. As a 
consequence, most of the popular social networking websites are transforming into 
mobile domain by offering exciting applications and games exclusively designed for 
users on the go. Some of these services include maps and Location Based Services 
(LBS) that influence the anonymity and privacy of users. There have been 
continuous doubts related to security concerns emerging due to the leakage of 
confidential data, copyrights violation, privacy of individual etc. Moreover there is a 
tendency among users to store private and sensitive data on their mobile phones as 
compared to typical personal computer like contacts, passwords, bank account 
details, updated calendar entries with key dates and personal notes. Hence, the 
situation arises to be a tradeoff among these exciting features and consequence 
security threats. 
          As mobile communications are considered to be fairly safe and trusted by end-
users, thus incorporating social networks should not compromise the attained 
security levels and avoid risks incorporated at internet level [1]. The success of any 
mobile social network primarily depends on its security based dimensions which 
includes secure registration and authentication, integrity control and privacy 
protection.  
          Most of the traditional services running on mobile phones require 
authentication and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) is a 3GPP‟s solution 
which help users to avoid manual management of credentials to access those services 
[2]. The GAA supports two different kinds of authentication mechanisms where the 
first rely on pre-shared secrets and the later use public, private key pairs and 
corresponding digital certificates to manage the authentication requirements of 
various applications [3].  
          The current thesis is a part of the Research and Development (R&D) project 
carried out at SICS in collaboration of Sony Ericsson [1]. It is an effort to probe and 
improve the existing key-exchange mechanisms for USIM, ISIM environments [4] to 
provide secure identification in mobile social networks. The solution provides secure 
authentication between the client and Mobile Social Networking Portal (MSNP). The 
prime focus for this particular thesis is to manage the secure communication between 
two mobile peers (Offline Mode) along with secure invitation from user of either 
network using novel key exchange mechanism by avoiding complete re-
authentication procedure. The solution is based on public, private key pairs and 
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corresponding authentication, signing and social certificates managed by the Mobile 
Network Operator (MNO). The registration, invitation and offline invitation process 
is emulated by implementing a prototype. Finally, preliminary security analysis is 
carried out for verification of the prototype. 
1.1 Project SWIN 
 
The Project Social Wireless Network Secure Identification (SWIN) [1] is carried out 
at Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS) in collaboration with Sony Ericsson 
Lund and Ericsson AB Stockholm. According to the basic guidelines available at [1], 
the project is intended to enhance current mobile security standards with a possible 
extension to incorporate the challenging security requirements of mobile based social 
networking portals. The project is carried out in three dimensions: 
 Authentication 
 Android Security 
 Privacy in Mobile Social Networks 
This particular thesis is primarily targeting the authentication part of the project. The 
potential problems that are related to privacy in mobile social networks like location 
based services and identity management are also probed at an abstract level. 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
 
Chapter 1 provides the basic introduction. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 cover the scope 
of the complete SWIN [1] project. Hence, these chapters cater the security 
requirements and literature summary related to the Mobile Social Network Portal 
(MSNP). Some of the potential use-cases along with their business and technological 
aspects are discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter also defines the security 
requirements for successful realization of the MSNP. Chapter 3 summarizes the 
research work done in the targeted domains related to MSNP and their brief 
summary. Chapter 4 illustrates the proposed solution only for the secure 
identification procedure in MSNP.  Chapter 5 covers the prototype implementation 
for this particular thesis. Chapter 6 remarks the conclusion and brief guideline for 
future work. 
1.3 Problem Definition 
 
The exciting features offered by existing mobile based social networks arise at a cost 
of privacy protection and anonymity disclosure. Decentralized online social networks 
are gaining popularity and transforming this phenomenon into mobile domain 
comprises additional security challenges. Therefore, the security challenges that 
needed to be tailored within this thesis can be summarized as: 
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 Strong authentication procedures for eradicating both active and passive 
threats. 
 Authorized client should register new members in offline mode. 
 Confidentiality and Integrity on the non-trusted media and collaboration with 
open compromised networks. 
 The solution should be in compliance with current GAA [3] standards. 
1.3.1  Originality 
 
Although the mobile bootstrapping technologies are targets of ongoing research 
activities but significant amount of work is needed for satisfying the security 
requirements of mobile social networks. Moreover, the concept of closed networks in 
mobile environment with exciting opportunities for offline communications is a 
novel idea. The prime reason for this situation is the fact that application 
authentication is considered out of the scope when it comes to GAA [3]
1
. 
Furthermore, targeting secure identification by focusing on the security requirements 
of decentralized mobile social networks is a quite new research domain.  
1.3.2 Scope of the thesis 
 
The scope of this thesis can primarily be categorized into two dimensions: 
 
1. The analysis and design which includes background study, identifying 
marketable use-cases, determining the security requirements, state of the art, 
middle ware architectural solution, targets the complete SWIN project. 
2. Besides that, the proposed design is validated through prototype 
implementations of server and client in this study, the main theme is to 
investigate and propose secure identification and key exchange mechanisms. 
The solution is able to withstand between online users and USIM based 
online and offline (direct mode) users.  
1.3.3 Research Questions  
 
Based on the problem definition described above, the following research questions 
were identified to be answered within this study: 
 
 RQ1: What would be the futuristic popularity trends of mobile based online 
social networks?  
- SQ1.1: Are there any potential use cases for de-centralized social 
networks or closed user groups? 
 RQ2: How can existing boot strapping and key-exchange mechanisms 
(GAA) can be extended to support secure authentication and accomplish 
security associations that would provide authentication and privacy 
protection? 
                                                     
1
 Please refer to Page 13 of 3GPP TS 33.919 (GAA Architecture) 
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 RQ3: Would the proposed solution be able to dynamically incorporate 
mutual authentication simultaneously in both online and direct (offline) mode 
of operations? 
 RQ4: How the solution would be flexible to be applied independently by 
using its key-exchange mechanism without SIM/USIM (GBA) based key-
exchange standards for providing autonomous security services? 
1.4 Aims and objectives 
 
 Analysis of current online and mobile based social networking solutions. 
 Predicting futuristic trends and identifying marketable use cases and the 
related security requirements.  
 Analysis of Boot Strapping and Key-exchange mechanisms [5, 6]. 
 Identifying the limitations of current Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 
(GBA) [6] standard to support closed mobile social networks. 
 Identifying problems and short comings of current GBA [6] authentication 
and key exchange mechanism to handle direct mode of communication. 
 Proposing design for secure identification. 
 Prototype implementation of the proposed design. 
 Report 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
The research is primarily based on the principle of induction and deduction. The 
research questions were carefully identified and then the solution was proposed to 
fulfill all the identified requirements. The intensive background study and proposed 
solution guided towards the prototype implementation. The results obtained from the 
implementation motivates for future work based on the deductive approach.  
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2 SECURE IDENTIFICATION 
 
Secure identification in terms of network security can be classified into various 
dimensions, which may comprise secure authentication, integrity control and privacy 
protection. Secure identification can provide revolutionary trend towards social 
networking, especially when extended to wireless or cellular networks domain. In 
this chapter, we will discuss some potential use-cases along with their analysis from 
business and technological point of view. Finally, we will discuss the minimal 
security requirements that are necessary to make these use cases realized into a 
workable solution. 
2.1 Use-Cases 
 
The services offered by existing online social networks revolutionized the existing 
social trends by providing online users a chance to share ideas with friends, friends 
of friends or even with those they don‟t know altogether. The extension of current 
online social networks into the mobile domain provide light weight versions 
accessible by mobile handsets having internet accessibility and some features like 
short messaging notifications etc. 
Although, whether the existing online social networks would be able to sustain 
continuing popularity is a highly debatable issue but there is an agreement in broader 
sense that the current open trend would be shifted towards closed user groups in the 
coming decade [13]. Some of these closed user groups are identified as use cases for 
this particular study from various alternative scenarios. The list is as follows: 
 
 Fashion Industry 
 Religious Factions 
 Business Network 
The particular set of functionality required for these use-cases is briefly explained 
below 
2.1.1 Fashion Industry 
 
This group should be dedicated to the modeling companies that arrange events 
related to fashion industry i.e. fashion shows, concerts, photo-shots, advertisements, 
social gatherings etc. 
Suppose a medium sized modeling company that is hiring staff comprising of 
managers, marketing personals, dress designers, choreographer‟s, beauticians, 
photographers, models, office staff etc. The company works in close co-operation 
with certain media groups and enterprises for marketing their products and arranges 
various events and fashion shows funded by enterprises. 
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Now the company would certainly like to have a secure mobile based social network 
which can become the backbone for its operations. Moreover the company would be 
working with various dress designers, beauticians, photographers around the globe 
based on the location of its next event. The prime focus of the event manager is to 
make sure that everything is perfect and every person involved should be aware of its 
role prior to the event.  
The portal will help the event manager for announcements and description of event, 
status and availability of models etc for specific events that are held overseas, post 
event discussions etc. 
 
The prime interests related to the services offered for these groups could be 
 Event Announcements and Schedule Updates 
 Calendar Sharing 
 Location Based Services to identify the location of personals in time critical 
situations. 
 Shows Details (Ramp Numbering etc.) 
 Document Sharing 
 Media Sharing 
 Post event Comments 
One of the important factors is the fact that there would be many personals in this 
specific group that would be member of more than one portal i.e. models, 
photographers. It would be cumbersome for them to manage separate identities for 
every portal. So the support of current identity services available in market [14] 
would be necessary along with other security requirements.  
 
Some users of this group would also be reluctant to reveal their location so they 
should be assured of anonymity protection if they don‟t want to disclose their 
identity at particular moment along with other security features. 
 
Another challenge would be to provide temporary access to some personals for some 
specific event i.e. company want to hire some specific beautician overseas for some 
particular event held at that country or city. Hence various user profiles should be 
maintained and security levels for these profiles must not be compromised. 
2.1.2 Religious Factions 
 
This use case is primarily intended for religious factions living in a particular locality 
or county. The prime objective would be to provide them a secure mobile social 
group to openly discuss their beliefs, share thoughts, organize and participate in 
various events etc. The group would also be interested in announcing community 
services and checking the availability of volunteer‟s for that specific task. There 
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would be some tasks held periodically for which they would be interested to acquire 
some specific personals like delivering lectures, debates etc. 
 
The services on which this group could be interested could be 
 
 Blogs 
 Daily/ weekly Updates about some holy texts etc 
 Community Service Notifications 
 Notifications and confirmations about gatherings 
 Location based services 
 Calendar sharing 
 Media Sharing 
The closed user group might be connected to another similar group of that particular 
community and user of one group must be identified by the users of the other groups 
in case of travel or permanent settlement to new area. Hence, providing strong 
authentication procedures within that group and intra group would be handy. 
2.1.3 Business Network 
 
This use case primarily targets company owners, directors of investment societies, 
business funds, stock holders etc. This group would certainly require secure mobile 
social group that keep them updated about the live business activities on the go. They 
would like to have live updates about stock market trends, gold and currency rates, 
property updates etc. This group would also be interested in some sort of social 
portal where they can acquire these specific updates and notifications about certain 
commodities, discuss investment ideas with their friends and share blogs to get 
advice from best in specific business domain.  
The type of services this group would be interested could be 
 
 Live updates of stock market, gold, currency, property rates etc. 
 Blogs 
 Graphs and charts depicting previous market trends 
 Reports about future analysis 
 Investment port folios 
 Documents Sharing 
This group would certainly require all the security and portability features that have 
already been mentioned in fashion and religious faction use cases i.e. secure 
authentication, anonymity protection, authentication forwarding, managing user 
profiles and identity service support. 
  16 
Due to the personal nature of mobile devices, there is a tendency among businessmen 
to store information about their investment port folios to keep track of things on the 
go. Therefore, the members of this group would also be interested in content privacy 
both within and outside the group. Investors would certainly not like to reveal any 
clue of their port folios based on surfing history or logs created due to their interests 
in some specific commodity i.e. bond, share, certificates etc.   
2.2 Use Case Analysis 
 
In this section, we provide analysis of the use-cases from the business and 
technological perspective. In business oriented analysis, only notable social networks 
having large user database and impact factor are considered [9]. The originality of 
our use-cases and key differences from existing social networks are also discussed. 
The technological aspect primarily covers the tools and expertise required to 
implement these use cases as a final product. 
2.2.1 Business aspect 
 
There is tremendous drift between all the mobile based use-cases presented above 
and traditional online alternatives for these types of requirements. We are only 
presenting some key short comings of traditional social networks to in-corporate our 
requirements mentioned in the previous section. Hence there are lots of potential 
scenarios for simple yet secure mobile social interactions. 
2.2.1.1 Business analysis-fashion industry 
 
Up till now there is not any famous online social network that has primarily focused 
on the fashion industry. Therefore most of the media giants and small companies 
have to depend heavily on human resource departments or individual personal to 
manage majority of the fashion events including photo shots, media interactions etc. 
The public figures from fashion industry also have to compromise between two 
extremes of using traditional public social networks or interacting privately with their 
colleagues etc. Moreover celebrities have a tendency of being tentative to reveal their 
identity to unknown online users. So there is a big potential for secure and closed 
social network alternative for this specific industry. Moreover the requirements 
discussed in our use case can‟t be catered by any online social network like location 
tracking; privacy protection, authentication forwarding, direct mode etc that should 
be only focused for a specific company or media group. 
2.2.1.2 Business analysis-religious faction 
 
Although there are some online open social networks that are specific for some 
religion [10, 11] or providing some sort of association among sacred places of that 
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particular religion. But there are some key differences among these and our proposed 
mobile social group which can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Open networks targeted to attract as many users as possible even for non-
believer of that specific religion 
 Primarily focused only on blogs 
 No real social activity in Particular County, neither targeting any community 
service etc. 
 No security profiles for authentication, privacy protection etc 
2.2.1.3 Business analysis-business network 
 
Just like religion, there are some notable online social networks [12, 13] targeting 
business community but all of them are open and primarily intended to share news 
and events related to business community. As already mentioned, the prime targets 
of references mentioned above and other networks is to attract as many users as 
possible and they are not concerned for providing real social activity in a closed, 
secure and mobile environment.  
 
Moreover online social networks related to business are also prone for mergers with 
big trade companies resulting in terminating services, closing user accounts, and off 
course revealing the status of existing user‟s port folios and identity information to 
the new owner‟s. This fact alone is the biggest concern for people of business 
community who want to interact socially but remain updated about their business 
activities securely. 
2.2.1.4 Customized Online Social Networks 
 
There are some online solutions that provide facility to create custom online social 
networks [14]. But there are lots of draw-backs in those solutions and they lack many 
of the features that our proposed closed mobile social networks can offer.  Only a 
few of large potential differences and short comings of these so called custom online 
social networks can be summarized as: 
 
 Considerable fee for just customizing limited set of services 
 Primarily Customer Management System (CMS) solutions, that allow minor 
modifications to the overall designed system and services 
 Resulting solution is a typical open social network targeting as many users as 
possible 
 Considerable overhead for setup and maintenance 
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2.2.2 Technological aspect 
 
The use cases defined above poses challenge to update existing security, media 
sharing, content distribution standards and bringing these technologies together for 
realizing mobile social networks.  All the use cases require a networking online 
portal that is accessible from mobile units. It is evident from use case diagrams that 
membership is restrictive as compared to traditional online social networks. Hence 
the portal must provide strong security guaranteeing that: 
 
 Only invited members can join the network after strong identification and 
verification mechanism. If registration is triggered by some other member in 
offline direct mode then secure identification and authentication procedures 
should be implemented.  
 There must be a strong authentication mechanism for user verification. 
Moreover in case of identity service, the overall system delay must remain 
under some well-defined threshold limits. 
 All communication between portal, fix or mobile terminals should be 
protected using confidentiality and integrity protection mechanisms. 
 Content storage and distribution mechanisms should be applied to prevent 
information leakage. 
 Anonymity prevention must also be assured using updated cloaking 
algorithms for location based services. 
 Role based authorizations support is necessary for managing access control 
based on users level and reducing the security maintenance overhead of 
moderators or super users.  
 
The new 3-4G networks provide speed as equivalent or in some cases slightly better 
connectivity as compared to wired solutions. Moreover, contrary to traditional slow 
mobile networks and units, the new mobile units offer considerable processing 
capabilities to handle the online applications. Hence, all the requirements can be 
realized by ordinary web client by using applets and ActiveX controls. The other 
approach could be to develop or merge special purpose applications targeting mobile 
units. 
 
Another technological aspect is to provide compatibility among current online 
OpenID standards with USIM architecture. The whole process should be secure, 
quick and must be transparent to the client in a seamless manner and should place 
less overhead as compared to current solutions.  
 
The media sharing can be easily managed using Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
[15], H.264 [16] video, G.726 [17] and other ITU-T audio standards currently used 
by Blue Ray, YouTube etc. Similarly there are numerous solutions available for 
managing blogs and sharing calendar such as iCalendar [18]. 
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Fig. 1: Use Case diagram of business network 
 
Some mobile social networks would also require complete role based security model 
as well as support for moderators or trusted third parties (based on their specific roll) 
to enroll offline users to the closed group and this new user should be seamlessly 
supported by the other members of that specific group.  
 
The general and simplest form of basic functional components of business network 
described above is depicted as an extended use case diagram in Fig. 1. The business 
network is supposed to be an independent system with all the functional 
requirements depicted as use cases. The above diagram clearly shows the challenge 
to cater requirements of several different closed network scenarios and to realize 
them through software architectures via mobile social network portal. 
 
In summary, most of the technologies along with components already exist in form 
of diverse software offerings. Hence to practically comprehend secure but light 
weight solution, a detailed study about current security standards and ongoing 
research work related to requirements of use cases is required. The outcome of that 
study would reveal the tactical and architectural methods to bring these fractions 
together into final solution offerings that are related to business models. 
 
Majority of the technological aspects discussed above could be compromised without 
strong key management, authentication and privacy protection support which is 
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backbone for the closed user interaction in secure way. In the SWIN project [1], our 
prime focus would be to probe and investigate the following security functions: 
 
 Authentication and key exchange 
 Secure Identity sharing in heterogeneous environments 
 Anonymity Protection 
2.3 Security Requirements 
 
It is evident from all the functional requirements presented at previous section in the 
form of use cases, that idea of closed social groups for targeted customers can only 
be realized by providing trustworthy and fool proof social networks in terms of 
security. This goal can only be achieved by identifying, listing and solving these 
requirements in a secure, yet efficient and user-friendly environment. The 
requirement set from use cases can be primarily sub-categorized among the 
following goals along with brief details about perspective of all the main actors 
involved in use cases:  
 
2.3.1 Secure Registration and Authentication 
 
 Only authorized client should be allowed to register in closed networks by 
enforcing strong authentication procedures. Strong access mechanism should 
be applied to eradicate fabrication and other un-authorized requests for 
gaining access. 
 Authorized client can register new members in offline mode by strong 
authentication procedures in confidential manner and ensuring integrity.  
 All active and passive attacks i.e. denial of service; traffic analysis etc. should 
be eradicated by enforcing strong authentication scheme. 
 The registration and authentication process should be in compliance or 
extension of current GBA based [6] authentication standards. 
 The whole registration process must be secure and all credentials of users 
should be transferred as cipher on unreliable media.  
 The portal should support the current and future identity sharing standards [8, 
5], in both online and offline mode. 
 The authentication procedure should support proxy mechanism, where one 
node attached to server might act as a gateway for offline client. 
 The complete data acquisition process between server and gateway should be 
confidential and ensure integrity of transmitted data over temporary 
connection. 
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 If a user is registered in offline mode to secure social network by another 
privileged user in legitimate manner, then the whole process of sharing and 
managing security associations in online mode should be transparent for the 
user and the whole procedure should be completed in seamless manner.     
2.3.2 Profiles and Location Based Services 
 
 All the users in closed social networks can‟t have same profiles or same set of 
privileges. Hence roll based security features should be supported by portal. 
 There should also be an option for setting explicit security settings for 
scenarios where role based security should not be considered flexible by key 
members, and who are ready for managing overhead for this sort of 
management.  
 The users should be guaranteed anonymity protection if they decline to 
register either permanently or temporarily for keeping their track through 
location based services.  
2.3.3 Access Control and Data Storage2 
 
 Strong access control mechanism must be enforced to keep the user data safe 
both from outside and inside the network. The origin of data must also be 
authenticated to avoid duplication. 
 The integrity of data must be verified at every instance to keep the database 
consistent and error free. 
 Content (user identity and data) storage and distribution must be securely 
preserved and transferred respectively. There must be DMZ implemented at 
server level along with strong access policies to prevent any content leakage. 
The challenging goal would be to achieve this task without compromising on 
quality standards or delaying services. 
2.3.4 Managing real-time services 
 
 The mobile devices are primarily designed for providing real-time audio 
service (with current trends toward video calling). So all the online and 
offline audio/video communication must provide confidentiality and integrity 
support during transmission on wireless medium. 
 Live streaming support should be handled by the portal in a secure yet 
maintaining threshold levels required for non-delayed, jitter free services. 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 The requirements are mentioned as they relate to the identified use-cases but are not part of this particular 
thesis. 
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2.4 Summary 
 
This chapter introduced secure identification in terms of social networks in cellular 
domain. The chapter identifies some potential use-cases that are unique in terms of 
user requirements on a mobile device. The differences between existing networks 
entities and the proposed solution are discussed in detail to demonstrate the market 
potential. Also the business and technological feasibility aspects have been conferred 
to make these use-cases realized in the social network portal. The security 
requirements that are assumed to be fundamental for the topic are also identified and 
can be of vital importance for final prototype development. 
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3 STATE OF THE ART 
 
This chapter primarily provides overview about the customary concepts and 
standards about mobile social networks, tools and technologies already deployed 
along with insight about futuristic emerging trends and research activities.    
As already discussed in previous chapter´s that mobile social networks offer some 
exciting application services like location based services, instant mobile messaging, 
instant notifications and communication facilities in either network or direct mode 
(push to talk, Bluetooth, WIFI) etc. But all this excitement comes at a cost of newly 
evolved security threats and compromises on privacy protection. There might be 
limited number of people who would be comfortable to reveal their exact location of 
presence as a consequence of using cellular service and this aspect alone might 
change user perspective about mobiles being personal in near future. Moreover there 
is a tendency among users to carry more sensitive data on their mobiles phones as 
compared to typical personal computer like contacts, passwords, bank account 
details, updated calendars entries with key dates and personal notes. So deployment 
of state of the art access control mechanisms on mobile devices to keep security of 
content storage is a prime need. All the communications (data and voice/video) 
should be encrypted on wireless channel regardless of any direct, indirect or dual 
mode of operation.  
The phenomenon of mobile social networks is relatively new and to manage all these 
newly emerged security threats that may prove critical in realization of real mobile 
social networks is a complex task and consequently popular topic of research 
activities around the globe.  
In the following sub-sections, we provide overview of conventional online social 
networks history and promising applications that are main reason for popularity of 
traditional and mobile social networks. But our focus would be to probe notable 
secure identification schemes and key management standards as well as latest 
research trends with later as main theme of discussion. 
3.1 Mobile Social Networks 
 
The online social networks phenomenon was spotted almost a decade ago and since 
then it has gain revolutionary popularity. We will provide brief history of traditional 
online networks and emerging trends focusing on mobile social networks. 
3.1.1 Online Social Networks 
 
Social networking services were started with the intention of linking small 
communities and providing them interacting services that will engage them via 
internet [19]. The first notable social networking website was found in the year 1997 
through formation of a company called Sixdegrees.com but the real boast was gained 
by Friendster that started its working in the year 2002 and was totally designed to 
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deal with the social aspect of the market. Later, MySpace gained popularity by 
providing some exciting features like personalizing web pages etc.  
The most popular social networking site Facebook was initially launched in 2004 for 
college networks but later due to its easy to manage media and graphic sharing 
features, it gained market share outpacing its rivals with around 500 million 
registered users as per August 2010 statistics. Finally, another social network giant 
Twitter and others emerged in market basically focusing and marketing on user 
interaction with idea of following celebrities, friends through short messaging blogs 
and providing media support via third party links [19]. 
3.1.2 Social Networks in Mobile Domain 
 
Mobile social network is an ongoing development that is gaining ever increasing 
popularity among users but still needs to manage issues such as hardware limitations; 
compatibility and security compromises to overcome. The mobile social networks 
provide some exclusive new features like short messaging notification, instant 
messaging, and location based services etc. But the real hazard lies with trade off 
with the confidentiality and personal life of individual. So there is a compromise 
among these exciting features and one‟s privacy protection.  
According to survey conducted in 2010 and available in [20], mobile social networks 
and communities continue to grow at an astounding rate.  The results of survey 
shows that almost 72% people are accessing internet using portable devices. The 
results are significant as this share was only 17% in a similar survey just three years 
ago in United States. There are lots of other predictions that mobile units would be 
prime source of internet access around 2015 and beyond. Moreover cellular users are 
more willing to pay for content on mobile devices than their inclination on desktops 
for a number of reasons, including: 
 
 Support of payment for real time services like iTunes etc. 
 Nominal charges by service providers after subscribing, especially in North 
America.  
 Ease of personalization i.e. changes of language, themes, settings etc. 
 Exclusive applications and games designed for users on the go. 
 
There are lots of social networking applications available in the market that are 
providing features like location awareness along with traditional social networking 
capabilities to attract customers. The notable social network services in terms of 
customer support are listed below 
 
 GyPSii [21] 
 Brightkite [22] 
 Loopt [23] 
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The overview of these mobile supporting social networks in terms of the services, the 
customer trend and the supported hardware and software platforms for each of these 
networks is provided below. 
3.1.2.1 GyPSii 
 
GyPSii combines desktop based services with extension for location based services 
with following main functions: 
 
 The user can associate media, text etc with favorite places that relates to 
physical location using maps. The service extends to providing search for 
locating and finding new friends and their favorite places and to get in touch 
via short messaging service etc. 
 The location information is automatically updated based on network ID or 
GPS, only if user wants to reveal its current location. The web clients using 
normal browser have the flexibility to reveal location by marking some place 
on the map. 
 The user can search for nearby places that suite his interest and even filter 
them on the basis of known and un-known users. 
 
GyPSii supports almost every mobile platform like Android, BlackBerry, iPhone, 
Java, Windows Mobile and Symbian S60. GyPSii is targeting China (already 800 
million mobile subscribers) and other Asian countries by making business alliances 
with local companies that provide promotional coupons for restaurants etc. In 
February 2010, GyPSii claims to have added almost one million new customers in 
previous quarter [21]. 
3.1.2.2 Brightkite 
 
Brightkite is another social networking service that is focusing mobile users. It 
supports short messaging exchange like Twitter and even provides interface to 
Facebook, Twitter etc. Brightkite does not support automatic update of location 
information but user has to manually “check-in” at a location for getting visible for 
other users in the network. But the application can “suggest” user location based on 
Cell ID when the client is accessing services using mobile device. 
Brightkite offers applications for Android, Nokia, BlackBerry and iPhone. Brightkite 
had almost 300,000 unique visitors in February 2010 but the rate drastically dropped 
below to 100,000 visitors in July 2010. The trend tough had reversed towards upward 
direction in August 2010 when the numbers of unique visitors have again reached 
100,000 [25]. 
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3.1.2.3 Loopt 
 
Loopt is another mobile based social network site that is primarily based in North 
America. It uses GPS for location sharing but only supports CDMA based networks 
resulting in very limited number of mobile devices supporting the services and 
depends on short messaging services for sharing location information.  
Loopt had around 125,000 unique visitors in March 2010 but the figures dropped to 
around 110,000 in August 2010 [26]. 
3.2 Secure Identification Schemes 
 
Secure identification in terms of network security can be classified into various 
dimensions, which extend to secure registration and authentication, integrity control 
and privacy protection. The sub-sections below provide brief overview of available 
schemes and future research trends regarding traditional ad hoc networks and mobile 
social networks.  
3.2.1 Secure routing schemes in Ad hoc networks using PKI 
 
Ad hoc networks have gain hype in recent years mainly due to their vast potential for 
providing new exciting applications for civil purposes after already gaining 
significant popularity in military infrastructures [27]. Some approaches were 
presented to use public key infrastructure to enhance security of routing protocols but 
these approaches clearly lacked the anonymity of routing information transferred 
[28]. 
In 2007, Rongxing Lu and others [29], proposed a secure anonymous routing 
protocol with authenticated key exchange (SARPAKE). The scheme is based on so 
called Designated Vector Scheme (DVS) [30]. The DVS scheme is different from 
standard digital certificates as authentication using signature is only distinguishable 
by the intended verifier. The scheme proposed in [29], claimed to provide round trip 
anonymity of route along with integrated key exchange mechanism based on DVS. 
3.2.2 Symmetric and Layered approaches 
 
The detailed information about Kerberos protocol is available at [31]. 
Kerberos is authentication protocol based on symmetric key encryption and is widely 
used and implemented at intranet level with support by almost all the OS systems 
vendors. The protocol approach is based on pre-shared secret between server and 
client and can be easily understood by the diagram given below: 
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TGS
Client
Database
 1: ID_C, ID_TGS
 5: Ticket(App), AV_2
 6: AV_App
 4: AUTH-2, Ticket(App)
 3: Ticket(TGS), AV_1, ID_App
Application Server
AS
Pre-Shared Secret
2: AUTH-1, Ticket(TGS)
 
Fig. 2: Kerberos version 5 based authentication scenario [31] 
 
The main theme of the Kerberos design was to make sure that apart from ID‟s of 
client and servers involved, everything is transmitted in cipher in the form of 
encrypted tickets and authenticators. The entities Authentication Server (AS) and 
Ticket Granting Server (TGS) shown in Fig. 2 can be implemented on same machine 
depending on network scalability and design. The steps shown in Fig. 2 can be 
summarized as: 
 
1. During step 1, client initiates authentication request by sending its own ID 
and ID of TGS. 
2. The AS retrieves pre-shared secret between client and TGS from database, 
creates session key for secure communication between client and TGS, add 
time stamp with lifetime and encrypts whole information with the client‟s 
secret key into single message which is referred as Authenticator (AUTH-1) 
in Fig. 2. Moreover the server encrypts the same information given above and 
the address of client for TGS using its secret key which is referred as Ticket 
(TGS).  
3. The client provides the Ticket (TGS), along with an authentication vector 
(AV_1) containing client ID, lifetime and address, encrypted by session key 
provided by AS in the previous step. 
4. The TGS performs the same tasks as in step 2 but uses application server 
(App) secret key to encrypt Ticket (App) and updates time stamp and lifetime 
information. 
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5. The client performs the same procedure as in step 3, but updates time stamp 
and lifetime info and encrypts authentication vector with new session key 
obtained in step 4. 
6. The application server responds with encrypted message using session key 
already shared, containing updated time stamp and lifetime to authenticate 
itself to the client. 
 
In 2004, Asad and Chris [32] proposed a modified version of Kerberos named 
Kaman for dynamically incorporating the requirements of ad hoc networks. The 
Kaman scheme was based on multiple Kerberos servers storing hash of pre-shared 
client passwords and communicating with each other to update user information 
along with option of load sharing. Although the scheme provides secure 
bootstrapping and authentication support based on steps already defined above, but 
only under assumptions that all clients and servers have already shared the pre-
shared secret in a secure way.  
Due to ad-hoc nature of MANET networks, every node manages routing tables and 
other network and security related tasks like packet forwarding, access control etc. 
So some layered approaches for node level security were suggested that classify ad 
hoc networks in trusted and non-trusted zones and provide layered authentication 
approaches to provide safety from external threats along with configurations 
mistakes and other internal network threats [33].  
3.2.3 Location Anonymity 
 
Location anonymity is major concern for exciting Location Based Services (LBSs) 
support available in mobile social networks and considered as main hurdle for large 
scale deployment of LBS as its compromises client privacy [34].   
The disclosure control protocols currently in use try to solve this problem by using 
randomness instead of client identity and K-anonymity factorization. The K-
factorization approach means that instead of revealing a client‟s exact location, the 
service provider would be reported cloaking area which would include at least K 
number of nodes. The location services are not supported if the client is at distant 
location and would be resumed later after re-computation of the cloaking area when 
the client moves closer to the other available nodes nearby. This theme inspired a lot 
of research publications all of which are primarily focused on minimizing cloaking 
area as much as possible but still don‟t compromising on client anonymity.  
One of the researches presented in [34] is the use of entropy by considering the 
numbers of nodes inside cloaking area along with their anonymity probability 
distribution. The above paper also applies polynomial time complexity technique to 
set optimal cloaking area that will not compromise on user anonymity. 
Another notable scheme is reporting K different footprints based on historical 
locations of different clients instead of computing K factor based on current locations 
of neighboring nodes. The main advantage of this scheme is not to update location 
tracking services if the client is not interested in revealing its identity as contrary to 
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current standards where the user must update its current location so that the 
algorithm can keep the cloaking area up to date [35]. 
3.3 Key Exchange Schemes 
This section is focused to provide sketch of traditional key exchange 
schemes used in fixed and mobile networks and their extension to incorporate the 
cellular nodes simultaneously.  We will also probe for identity sharing mechanism 
like OpenID [8] that provide the facility of single sign-on (SSO) to reduce the client 
handling of multiple username and password pairs for different websites. There is 
also continuing research to provide solution for compatibility of such identity 
management schemes among various vendors and with USIM/ISIM standards.  
 
3.3.1 Secure Identity Management and Sharing  
 
Identity sharing is an idea to provide SSO services to solve the user‟s 
problem of managing multiple login credentials for various sites. The most notable 
identity management providers were Windows CardSpace and VeriSign Identity 
Protection (also known as VIP) [36, 37].  In 2006
3
, a consortium comprising of 
various vendors was formed for providing global identity standard (OpenID) that 
should be transparent for end users [38, 8]. The basic aim was to develop a 
lightweight protocol for URL authentication using standard HTTP protocol.    
3.3.1.1 OpenID Authentication and Key Exchange Mechanism 
 
For interested readers, the detailed information about protocol architecture and the 
detailed specification can be found in [8]. We only focus on authentication steps and 
some common terminologies in this section to provide brief overview of 
authentication and key exchange procedures.
4
  
 
 The identifier is client unique OpenID identifier in HTTP or HTTPS format. 
 The user agent is client web browser that should support HTTP ver1.1. 
 The Relaying Party (RP) is the application server website, where user wants 
to reveal identity for gaining access. 
 The OpenID Provider (OP) refers to OpenID providers like Google, 
Microsoft etc. 
 OP identifier is the identifier of the OpenID provider to the client and OP 
endpoint URL is a valid HTTP or HTTPS address for verification. 
 
                                                     
3
 Interested readers can find more information about identity management among vendors in [38] 
4
 The information is extracted from [8] and paraphrased for ease of reader understanding 
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The steps involved in authentication and key exchange using OpenID are shown in 
Fig. 3. The steps marked with dashed line are optional and the complete procedure 
can be summarized as: 
User Agent
Relaying Party (RP) ID Provider (OP)
1: User Identifier
2: Security Association (Optional)
3: Authentication Request
Extract Pre-
shared client 
information 
from database
4: Authorization Step
5: Authentication Approved/Failed
6: Signature Verification
 
Fig. 3: OpenID Authentication flow 
 
1. The user invokes the authentication by providing its identifier to a Relaying 
Party (RP) via user agent (web browser or application). 
2. The RP establishes the OP endpoint URL, and (optionally) creates a security 
association (SA) with OP based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange algorithm. 
3. The RP redirects the user agent with authentication request to OP. 
4. The OP authorizes the client and redirects him towards the RP whether the 
authentication was approved or failed. 
5. The RP verifies the return URL, nonce, shared key (if optional association 
was established in step 2) and complete authentication procedure or sends 
request to OP for signature verification (if SA was not established in step 2). 
There is a continuing debate about security of authentication procedure provided by 
current OpenID standard and its poor security architecture such as non-hashed nonce 
etc. The vulnerabilities to man in the middle and other security attacks are discussed 
in [39]. 
Many anti-phishing techniques are presented since then in various research 
literatures; notable among these is HwanJin Lee and others [40]. Portable tokens 
(based on PKI) and authentication e-mails are suggested to prevent phishing. During 
signing at OP, the user should save the OP authentication number on its machine. 
Now every time when some RP relays any user request to OP, it should authenticate 
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it by verifying the certificate from client machine and also forwarding that number to 
the client by e-mail for verification. 
3.3.2 Generic Authentication Architecture 
 
The detailed information about Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) 
can be found in [3]. GAA is an application layer architecture primarily developed for 
mobile devices and runs on top of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The 
specification is used to provide mutual authentication support between User 
Equipment (UE) and Network Application Server (NAF) that may support 
heterogeneous applications. The main advantage of this scheme is to reduce the 
client effort for managing multiple authentication profiles for different types of 
mobile applications along with much improved levels of security.  
The GAA supports two different types of authentication mechanisms where the first 
mechanism rely on symmetric encryption scheme using pre-shared secrets and the 
later uses public key cryptography with (public, private) key pairs and digital 
certificates. GAA relies on 3GPP AKA mechanism to share common secret between 
clients and application servers [3]. 
 
GAA
GBA
Pre-Shared Secret
Certificates
HTTPS and AP
SSC
(Public/Private Key Pair)
   
 
Fig. 4: GAA Architecture 
 
The general usage of GAA shown in Fig. 4 can be summarized as: 
 
 The pre-shared secret is used for mutual authentication between user 
equipment (UE) and MNO. All future session keys can be fetched from the 
operator based on this secret. This procedure is also referred as Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [6]. 
 “In the second case, GAA is used to authenticate a certificate enrolment 
request by the client. Initially, the bootstrapping procedure is carried out as in 
the previous case followed by the client request for certificates from the 
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operator‟s PKI infrastructure, where the authentication is done by the session 
keys obtained by accomplishing the bootstrapping procedure. These 
certificates and the corresponding key pairs can then be used to produce 
digital signatures for e-commerce applications or to authenticate to a server 
instead of using the session keys” [2, 3]. 
 The support for Subscriber Certificate (SSC) can be performed by either pre-
loading the certificate in Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) or 
dynamically by obtaining digital certificate.  
 Finally the Authentication Proxy (AP) is used for communication with 
several application servers (AS) in transparent manner and thus reduces the 
computational overhead of client device due to less Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) sessions. 
3.3.3 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) 
 
The detailed information about generic bootstrapping architecture can be 
found in [6]. GBA is referred as the 3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
standard for providing secure bootstrapping functionality between user equipment, 
mobile network operators and various application servers.  
 
SLF
HSS
NAF
ZN-Proxy
UE
Ub
Zh
Ua
Zn
Dz
BSF
Zn
 
Fig. 5: GBA network model with application server outside internal network [6] 
 
The old standard that uses mobile equipment to store authentication details was 
referred as GBA_ME, with the new GBA_U standard storing these details on UICC 
based SIM cards for added security protection and scalability. Although the GBA do 
not provide single sign-on service (SSO) like OpenID, the basic idea was to securely 
authenticate mobile users for various application servers by using pre-shared security 
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information among the operators and end-users stored in SIM cards. There are lots of 
changes among the old GBA_ME, and new USIM based GBA_U standard that is 
updated on new UICC compliant SIM cards but after assuring backward 
compatibility support. 
The GBA network model is shown in Fig. 5. The UE performs authentication with 
bootstrapping server function (BSF) maintained by MNO. The UE and BSF mutually 
authenticate each other using HTTP digest AKA protocol [41] using Ub interface. 
The user communicates with the network application server (NAF) using Ua 
interface. The NAF can be internal application service maintained by the MNO or 
any external application using heterogeneous protocol. In later case, the NAF must 
communicate with the BSF using Zn-Proxy over the Zn interface. The Zn-proxy is 
not required if both BSF and NAF are on the same mutually trusted MNO network. 
The BSF communicates with Home Subscriber System (HSS) which stores the pre-
shared secret (IMSI etc.) over the Zh interface using Diameter Base Protocol [24]. If 
MNO maintains multiple HSS then BSF must communicate with Subscriber 
Location Function (SLF) over Dz interface to determine the HSS to use. The usage 
of SLF is optional and depends on network model of MNO [6, 2]. 
3.3.3.1 Bootstrapping Procedure 
 
The UE must perform a bootstrapping procedure with BSF whenever it wants to 
access some application from AS whether internally or using Zn-proxy. Once the 
bootstrapping is accomplished, the UE should be required to repeat the same 
procedure if the lifetime of session keys have expired or if some AS requires 
bootstrapping re-negotiation. 
 
UE
HSSUser Identity Request
Retrieve User Profile on Zh interface
Run AKA, 
Verify AUTN, 
derive 
Session Keys 
and RES 
digest 
[401, RAND, AUTN]
Request Authorization using RES
200 OK
B-TID, Key Lifetime
Ks = CK|IK
Verify RES 
and generate 
Ks = CK|IK
BSF
 
Fig. 6: Bootstrapping procedure [6] 
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The UE initiates the authentication request in Fig. 6 and BSF retrieves the user 
profile and GBA user security settings (GUSS) information from HSS, computes 
cryptographic vectors and forwards that encrypted challenge to the UE based on TLS 
tunnel along with typical HTTP 401 un-authorized response. The user computes its 
response and sends back to BSF which verifies it and calculates bootstrapping 
transaction identifier (B-TID) and lifetime of Ks based on cipher key (CK) and 
integrity key (IK). User calculates Ks based on B-TID on its UE and stores it in 
UICC in case of GBA_U or mobile equipment if GBA_ME is used to complete 
bootstrapping procedure [6]. 
3.3.4 Support for subscriber certificates (SSC) 
 
The detailed information about support for subscriber certificates within 
GAA framework can be found in [42]. The SSC mechanism was developed to 
support global standardization of authorization and charging infrastructure for mobile 
commerce, building global public key infrastructure (PKI) along with local 
architectural support for digital signatures. The important notion about local 
architecture is that every MNO can implement its own architecture for digital 
signatures independently [42]. 
 
UE
Ub
Zn
PKl
(NAF)
BSF
Ua
 
Fig. 7: Reference model for issuance of certificates [42] 
 
The PKI portal tasks in above figure can be classified in two dimensions. Firstly it 
should be able to issue a certificate for client requested application using B-TID trust 
already developed during GBA process using reference point Ub. However, later it 
can also act only as a registration authority (RA) for some existing PKI infrastructure 
and operator certificate (CA) would be stored in PKI infrastructure [42]. 
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3.3.4.1 Certificate issuing architecture 
 
The reference point Ua in Fig. 7 is used for verifying client key pair and issuance of 
MNO certificate to the UE. The architecture must also support wireless integrity 
module (WIM) [43] support which can store private key information on UICC in 
GBA_U [42].  
 
UE
PKI Portal         Initial HTTP request
Calculate 
GetKeyAssurance 
using WIM and 
HTTP Digest
HTTP response with authentication challenge
Generates 
PKCS#10 request 
HTTP request with challenge response and WIM challenge request
Portal verifies UE 
response by session 
key based on 
username. If 
success, it processes 
the WIM challenge 
HTTP request with PKCS#10
Portal processes 
the PKCS#10 
request
HTTP response with subscriber certificate
HTTP response containing WIM challenge response
UE stores 
certificate
 
Fig. 8: Message flow for issuing certificate [42] 
 
The UE in above figure sends empty HTTP request for certificate to NAF over Ua 
reference point. The PKI sends Authenticate header with typical HTTP 401 
unauthorized response. The UE now uses its B-TID obtained during GBA process 
from BSF along with optional WIM challenge to the PKI. The PKI must interact with 
BSF to fetch NAF specific session key Ks_NAF to verify user response. The PKI 
uses GUSS for optional WIM challenge response. The client send PKCS#10 [42] 
based digested request which is followed by certificate integrity protected using 
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Ks_NAF. The client stores the obtained certificate either on ME or UICC based on 
internal management system [37]. 
 
3.3.5 SPKI and SDSI  
 
Simple Public-Key Infrastructure/Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure was 
primarily designed as an alternative to the X.509 standard in early 2000 to provide 
access control and flexibility to secure distributed communication in non-trustable 
environment [45].  
The main advantage of this scheme was support for group management using bottom 
up approach without any global hierarchy and trusted root that will lead to delegate 
authorizations. The main idea was to deal every public/private key pair as a 
certificate and build a guard model that is basically providing access controls to a 
particular object or resource by assigning, revoking and updating the giving set of 
authorizations [46]. 
3.3.6 Device Pairing 
 
Device pairing over insecure wireless channel without the aid of any external link or 
mutually trusted 3
rd
 party relies heavily on strong key management and 
authentication procedures. The notable solutions for such problems are defined in 
[47, 48]. These solutions can provide basic foundation for secure authentication of 
two devices in offline mode and can be easily modified for exchange of certificates 
and other services. The solutions differ slightly based on device capabilities available 
with user or required input by the device operator.  
The solutions can be categorized as: “using data output of one device as input of 2nd 
device, comparing output of both devices and entering same data into both devices” 
[47]. 
 
Mobile Device 1
Send (DSS2)
Compute 
Asymmetric 
Keys, Random # 
N1 and 
DSS1=Ek1p(N1)
Send (DSS1)
Encrypt 
Symmetric Key 
using K2c
Share Public Key = K1c
Compute 
Asymmetric 
Keys, Random # 
N2 and 
DSS2=Ek2p(N2)
Send Symmetric
Prompt User 
Sum2
Mobile Device 2
Share Public Key = K2c
Extract N2 and 
calculate 
Sum1= N1+N2
Extract N1 and 
calculate 
Sum2= N1+N2
Extract 
Symmetric Key 
and prompt 
Sum1
User Verficication: Sum1=Sum2
 
Fig. 9: Device pairing using user verification scheme [48] 
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The work done in [48] is based on comparing output of both devices and can be 
easily understood by the Fig. 9. Both parties calculate asymmetric key pair of public 
(Kc) and private (Kp) keys along with random numbers N1 and N2. The random 
numbers are signed using private key and shared among devices. In next step public 
keys are shared to read signed messages of previous step and both parties calculate 
sum of corresponding random numbers. The symmetric encryption key used for 
confidentiality for further session is shared in next step and decrypted using already 
available public key of other user. Finally the user manually verifies the Sum on both 
devices to complete the authentication step [48]. 
  
3.3.7 Manual Authentication Using MAC (MANA III) 
 
MANA is set of authentication protocols that are primarily used for mutual 
authentication among mobile nodes without the need of any 3
rd
 party mediation or 
where the communication with 3
rd
 party itself can‟t be trusted. The protocol family 
has different variants based on user input and device characteristics used by user 
during authentication process. In one scheme, devices should be equipped for taking 
input from user and typing some string on both or one mobile units involved. 
Another scheme is to verify the output of both devices by visual means without any 
need to input some shared string and thus only display on UE is required. The 
detailed information about these protocols can be found in [47]. 
The MANA III variant which is based on Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
scheme and requires users to input same string on both devices is shown in Fig. 10. 
Suppose two users A and B want to communicate using mobile devices 1 and 2 
respectively. Subsequently, following are the steps mentioned in [47] for performing 
secure pairing.  
1. Both parties must agree on shared data string D over wireless channel. 
2. Both users enter a short random string R of length around 16-20 bits in their 
devices. 
3. The user A on Device 1 generates a random MAC key K1 and compute hash 
of R, D and identifier of A, say MAC1. The user A sends MAC1 to user B. 
4. The user B on Device 2 generates a random MAC key K2 and compute hash 
of R, D and identifier of B, say MAC2. The user B sends MAC2 to user A. 
5. After receiving MAC2 from B, A sends the K1 to B. 
6. The user B computes MAC1 from K1 received in previous step and verifies 
it by comparing with MAC1 received from A. If the value of MAC1 is same 
then user B selects OK message and sends K2 to A. 
7. The user A computes MAC2 from K2 received in previous step and verifies 
it by comparing with MAC2 received from B. If the value of MAC2 is same 
then user B selects OK message to complete successful pairing. 
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Send MAC1
Input R, 
Generate K1 and 
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Share K1
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Fig. 10: Manual authentication using MAC [47] 
 
3.4 Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
 
The detailed information about Transport Layer Security (TLS) is available in [49]. 
TLS is successor of Secure Socket Layer protocol (SSL) which was originally 
developed in 1995 by Netscape Corporation to secure communication over internet 
using their web browser. The protocol was later standardized in 1999 by internet 
engineering task force and its basic architecture is almost the same as SSL but with 
some functional changes to improve security i.e. additional alert messages, more 
resistance to DOS attacks etc. 
 
Application (HTTP) 
TLS Handshake Protocol TLS Alert Protocol TLS CCS 
TLS Record Protocol 
TCP 
IP 
Fig. 11: TLS Protocol Stack [49] 
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TLS is based on client/server architecture and runs on top of TCP protocol (although 
new variants support UDP) at transport layer as shown in Fig. 11. The protocol uses 
asymmetric encryption for authentication and key exchange (RSA and Diffie-
Hellman etc), symmetric encryption (RC4, DES, 3DES, IDEA etc) for 
confidentiality of communication and hashing algorithms (MD5 and SHA-1) for 
providing integrity. TLS is the primarily superset of four different protocols to secure 
communication among client/server using a single or multiple simultaneous 
connections. We provide overview of these protocols below: 
 
3.4.1 TLS Handshake Protocol 
 
The handshake protocol is used for key exchange, authentication and establishment 
of logical connection between the communication parties. All the cryptographic 
negotiations, authentication vectors for session setup and keys for further 
communication are derived during handshake process. The handshake protocol is 
illustrated in Fig: 12 and uses eight compulsory and five optional messages. The 
optional messages are shown as dashed lines and the total procedure can be 
summarized as: 
 
1. During step 1, the client initiates a session by sending Hello message. The 
client hello message include following information. 
 
 Version Info 
 Session ID 
 32 byte random number 
 Cryptographic details (browser support for encryption, hashing, 
compression etc) 
2. The server gives its response by sending server Hello message, by selecting 
the cryptographic parameters included in client Hello along with its version 
support and random number. The server may optionally provide its certificate 
and may demand for client certificate. 
3.  Notification to the client along with server public key. 
4. The client may provide certificate if server has requested, compute 48 byte 
master secret from random numbers of server and client and pre-master 
secret. The clients also encrypts pre-master secret from server public key 
received previous step and send it to the server. 
5. The client generates session keys from master secret and sends CCS message 
to notify server that the further communication would be encrypted using the 
cryptographic parameters already negotiated. CCS is a separate entity and not 
part of handshake protocol but mandatory during handshake procedure. 
6. The client notification to server that it‟s computational processing has 
finished. 
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Fig: 12: TLS Handshake Protocol [49] 
 
7. The server must compute the master secret and session keys. The server must 
unsure that it must use the same cryptographic parameters (pre-master secret) 
sent by the client during step 4. 
8. The server sends finished message. Note that in SSLv3 the client was able to 
start sending application data without waiting for server finished message but 
this procedure has been changed in TLS. The client cannot start encrypting 
application data unless it receives server‟s finished message. 
3.4.2 TLS Change Cipher Specs (CCS) 
 
This is one byte value that is shared during handshake protocol to notify the other 
party about the current cryptographic parameters used and for verification of the 
active state. 
3.4.3 TLS Alert Protocol 
 
This protocol is used for keeping the other party up-to-date with the state of 
connection and these messages are encrypted using active state parameters 
negotiated during handshake. The alerts are of type “warning” and “fatal”. If a alert 
is received from either of the communication parties having type “fatal”, the 
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communication among parties is immediately terminated i.e. decompression_failure, 
certificate_revoked etc.  
3.4.4 TLS Record Protocol 
 
The record protocol is responsible for fragmentation, encryption, hashing and 
optional compression of data during sending and performs the vice versa operations 
at receiving side. 
3.5 Summary 
 
 This chapter provides overview of the customary concepts and standards about 
mobile social networks and the available tools and technologies. The chapter has 
provided insight towards the existing social networks within the mobile domain and 
services offered by them. It has highlighted the customer trends towards these 
networks which can be helpful for determining the future predictions. Moreover, the 
chapter has also provided necessary details to understand main tools and 
technologies already deployed, along with the insight about futuristic emerging 
trends and research directions. The chapter clearly illustrates about short comings of 
existing solutions and protocols to cater the requirements of secure and interoperable 
mobile social networks and motivates for enhanced research activities. 
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4 SECURE IDENTIFICATION DESIGN 
 
This chapter provides the details about solution based on fulfilling the requirements 
discussed in the previous chapters. This specification provides architecture for the 
secure identification, to support Mobile Social Network Portal (MSNP) in both 
offline and online mode.  
The solution comprises of typical online identification, authentication using TLS 
along with offline authentication and key exchange mechanisms in compliance with 
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) specification. We have chosen the 
certificate sharing mechanism for performing secure identification and authentication 
of a user due to number of technical reasons described later in this chapter. The 
Network Elements (NE), interfaces, cryptographic parameters and detailed 
procedures for authentication and key-exchange are also presented. 
4.1 Architecture Overview 
 
Fig. 13 shows the network model for extending GAA infrastructure for bootstrapping 
and certification and its extension to support MSNP.  
 
UE
Ub
Zn
BSF
Ua
Zsn
MSNPNAF/PKI
Usn
 
Fig. 13: Simple model for mobile social network portal 
 
The solution is based on public/private key pairs and corresponding certificate signed 
by the PKI portal managed by the Mobile Network Operator (MNO). The solution 
can be distributed among following networking elements: 
 
 The security profile needed for bootstrapping is being named as User Security 
Settings (USS) and is managed by the PKI portal over Zn interface or via Zn-
proxy in case of foreign network.  
 The MSNP would extend these USS for issuing, delivering and revocation of 
certificates. This particular set of data gathered from the user including 
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additional information related to certificates structure would be termed as 
MSNP based User Security Settings (MUSS) in rest of the document. The 
MUSS is needed to specify the role of specific user within various social 
groups.  
 The bootstrapping procedure and agreement on session keys to be utilized by 
the MSNP would be managed using standard GBA bootstrapping procedure 
defined in 3GPP TS 33.220 [6] over Ub interface. The PKI portal will 
manage certificates as mentioned in 3GPP TS 33.221 [42] specification based 
on USS and an extension for secure mapping using local profile information 
obtained from MSNP. 
4.1.1 Certificate Structure 
 
The certificates should be issued using X.509 version3 extended certificate format as 
mentioned in RFC 3280 [49]. The X.509 version3 allows flexibility for having 
additional attributes apart from compulsory standard attributes in certificate 
extension. One example can be the “explicitText” field attribute in standard 
extensions which allows organizations to insert 200 characters string directly into the 
certificate to manage the additional set of identities required. This field should be 
used to include the group identification information of specific closed group in 
MSNP. 
4.1.2 Database Model 
 
The database model for authentication module of MSNP is shown below. The model 
does not include the format of managing certificate store at PKI portal, trust 
hierarchy towards operator root certificate etc. The model presented below only 
provides facility for secure mapping of MSNP based User Security Settings (MUSS) 
to support issuance/updating the social certificates issued to users interacting within 
various closed social groups. The certificate issuing and management procedure will 
follow the 3GPP TS 33.221 [42] specification with an addition to secure mapping 
over Zsn interface and issuance of social certificates to the MSNP user.  
 
 
Fig 14: Database model for MSNP secure identification module 
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4.1.2.1 tbl_users: 
The table will include unique identification of the registered user along with other 
attributes. The proposed User_ID should be MSISDN of that user.  
4.1.2.2 tbl_groups 
The table will store records of all mobile social network groups. The table will 
maintain User_ID as foreign key for group moderator, date of creation and group 
status to check whether the group is kept in active state by the moderator. 
Note: There can be more than one moderator of the same social group. The 
„tbl_group_members‟ table will identify those roles. The created by attribute of this 
table is for unique identification of group creator who can deactivate/activate the 
particular group later. 
4.1.2.3 tbl_roles 
The table will store the defined roles by the MSNP associated with unique „Role_ID‟ 
like moderator, member, temporary member, pending etc. 
4.1.2.4 tbl_group_members 
The table consists of foreign keys to uniquely identify the user belonging to specific 
group and their corresponding roles. The table can be implemented as database view 
instead of physical table depending upon implementation. 
4.1.2.5 tbl_invited_members 
This table will store status of all the online invitations by various group moderators. 
The table will uniquely identify the invitation and their expiry date set by 
moderators. 
4.2 Networking Elements and Requirements 
 
The required functionality for the networking elements shown in Fig. 13 can be summarized 
as: 
4.2.1 User Equipment 
 
The user equipment must support all the requirements mentioned in 3GPP TS 
33.220, 33.221 [6, 42] with following additional functionality: 
 
 The UE must install plug-in for browser for managing additional certificate 
enrolment and signing procedures to communicate securely over Usn 
interface with the MSNP. 
 The plug-in and client application should be able to interact with NAF/PKI 
using HTTPS protocol with TLS extensions support as mentioned in RFC 
4366 [50]. 
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 The UE will maintain certificate store to store its certificates along with the 
public/private key pair. The access control mechanism to ensure device 
security is out of scope of this thesis. 
Note: To support offline communication with other registered users and use 
offline features of MSNP, the user should be recommended to install client 
version of the application. 
4.2.2 Bootstrapping server function (BSF) 
The BSF must support all the requirements mentioned in 3GPP TS 33.220, 33.221 
[6, 42] with an addition to the support MUSS which are needed to issue, update or 
revoke social certificates. 
4.2.3 PKI 
The PKI portal must support all requirements mentioned in 3GPP TS 33.221 [42] 
and NAF requirements specified in 3GPP TS 33.220 [6] with following additions: 
 The PKI must support HTTPS with TLS server extensions as mentioned in 
RFC 4366 to securely communicate with UE over Ua interface.  
 The PKI portal must complete the GBA bootstrapping procedure using 
specific User Security Settings (USS) obtained over Zn interface from BSF to 
authenticate the UE and update MSNP over Zsn interface. 
 The PKI portal will provide mapping to the MSNP requests for verification of 
client after generation of key pair using GBA upon successful completion of 
authentication procedure over the Zn interface. The PKI portal will create, 
update and revoke certificates for the user. 
 There would be already a PKI portal managed by the MNO for certificate 
issuance, revocation for other applications. The PKI portal supporting MSNP 
will only provide the GBA based User Security Settings (USS) along with 
certificate hierarchy and revocation lists. 
4.2.4 MSNP 
 
The MSNP would manage: 
 
 Issuance and updating the social certificates to the users. The MSNP database 
would manage group creation, login facility to the online users etc as shown 
in Fig 14. 
 The profiles/roles of all registered, invited users. These profiles would be 
linked with different social network identities, as moderator of one social 
network might be the ordinary user of another social network.  
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 The mapping that will authorize users inside one social network to use 
various services is based on user roles within specific social group.  
4.2.5 Reference point Zsn 
 
During authentication and key-exchange phase the reference point Zsn is used for: 
 
 The MSNP would relay the user‟s registration/authentication requests to the 
PKI portal over Zsn. 
 The PKI portal will provide registration confirmation/failure response. 
 The Zsn would be used for searching PKI repository for registered users of 
some other application managed by MNO or to MSNP for mapping of social 
certificates based on MUSS to enforce authorization. 
 The users already registered to MSNP and holder of CA signing and social 
certificates should be authenticated using mapping between PKI and MSNP 
based user security settings, without invoking the GBA procedure over the Zn 
interface with BSF. 
4.2.6 Reference point Ub andUa  
The reference points Ua and Ub should support all the requirements mentioned in 
3GPP TS 33.220 [6] to mutually authenticate UE and BSF using HTTP Digest AKA 
protocol, certificate request and response, certification of public keys, XML 
encryption etc. 
4.2.7 Reference point Usn 
The Usn interface should support all requirements of Ua interface with addition to: 
 Support XML encryption and integrity standards [51]. 
 Usn may support TLS extensions as described in RFC 4366. This will 
facilitate virtual hosts over single physical address to provide transparent 
communication for UE towards PKI/NAF and MSNP.  
 The identification, verification and registration of the user presenting 
invitation XML structure “InvStruct_N” to the MSNP, obtained from 
moderator after offline invitation. 
4.3 Key Exchange Scheme 
 
The solution comprises of providing secure registration, certificate enrollment and 
mutual authentication in both online and offline modes. There are various possible 
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set of scenarios in each mode and every scenario as well as certificate enrollment, 
sharing and authentication procedure can be elaborated as: 
4.3.1 User Certificate Enrollment 
  
Each MSNP will issue three certificates for identification, verification and 
maintaining status profile within each social group. The basic requirements and the 
type of certificates issued to cater these demands within the solution can be 
summarized as: 
 
1) Every MSNP user will be issued one identity certificate for secure 
identification. Let us call this AuthCert_A, AuthCert_B etc. (for user A, 
B…). 
2) The user should be able to verify different service requests etc. To ensure 
this, every user will be issued a signing certificate, SignCert_A, SignCert_B 
etc. (for user A, B…). 
3) The MSNP registered user and holder of identity and signing certificates can 
be a part of more than one social network. Moreover the user might have 
different roles within different networks and these roles may change over 
time. So each user also has an additional certificate for verification of his/her 
membership and specific role in different groups. This certificate includes all 
groups that the particular user is a member of and the status of the group. 
This certificate will be referred as SocialCert_A, SocialCert_B etc. (for user 
A, B…). The SocialCert must also contain pointers (One-way hash over the 
complete certificate or just the public key) to the AuthCert and SignCert. 
Note: The certificates can expire and revoked in a number of scenarios mentioned in 
3GPP TS 33.221 [42]. The joining of new group or any change in user status in 
MSNP database will result in updating of his/her social certificate. This includes a 
repeated GBA bootstrap procedure and the issuing of a new “SocialCert” to that 
particular user. 
4.3.2 New registration and creation of new social group 
When the UE communicates with the MSNP via browser, it is instructed to 
download and install the MSNP plug-in for browser or MSNP client application to 
the UE. 
Note 1: The plug-in support should provide platform independence as the client 
might be using other mobile operating system than supported by the MSNP client 
application. In case, if the UE selects to install MSNP client application, then the 
client might be opted to install additional plug-in available for the browsers  
providing him option to communicate with MSNP without using client application.  
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Note 2: The interoperability support for OpenID infrastructure as defined in 33.980 
can also be supported later. 
 
UE
1: Register
3: Certificate Request using TLS
2: Authentication Request
Create new profile 
and update MSNP 
based User 
Security Settings  
4: Bootstrapping using gba_me or gba_uicc
6: Authentication Approved
7: Authorization and Verification
MSNP PKI/NAF BSF
Check Certificate 
store and derive 
response
5: Certificate enrollment procedure using 3gpp TS 33.221
. 
Fig. 15: New user registration flow 
 
1. The UE will start TLS secure session with client using already installed plug-
in or client application. MSISDN should be used as client id for initiation of 
secure identification procedure.  
2. The MSNP will verify the identity of the UE to establish that the UE is new 
user or an existing MSNP user. In later cases, it will forward UE request for 
registration or communication along with MSISDN to the local PKI/NAF for 
verification of authenticity. The PKI portal will send certificate request 
message to UE.   
3. The UE will check the supported certificate list mentioned in certificate 
request message and reply with empty response (UE can reply with operator 
AuthCert if it already holds such certificate in its certificate store). The 
PKI/NAF will initiate bootstrapping procedure and request UE to start GBA 
based authentication procedure. The UE and BSF will mutually authenticate 
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each other over Ub interface and derive session keys using AKA protocol as 
mentioned in 3GPP TS 33.220 [6]. 
4. The UE will respond to PKI/NAF with B-TID obtained via GBA process in 
previous step. The BSF will validate this B-TID with BSF over Zn interface 
(via Zn proxy in case of foreign network) as mentioned in 3GPP TS 33.220 
[6].  
5. If the client is authenticated then the client will be issued new authentication 
and signing certificates signed by PKI portal according to the 3GPP TS 
33.221 [37] specification using X.509 certificate structure. 
6. The PKI/NAF will update the MSNP application over Zsn interface and user 
registration process will be completed. Furthermore, user would be able to 
create new social group with active status. New social network with unique 
name/ID is created and MUSS is updated with MSISDN of that UE as 
moderator of that particular social network group. 
7. The MSNP will securely interact with UE to allow user to use social network 
group and assign the particular MSISDN as moderator of that group as role 
status. The MUSS for this particular user is updated to the PKI over Zsn 
interface, which will create new social certificate and deliver to the client 
over Ua interface. 
4.3.3 Secure authentication of registered users 
 
The registered users of MSNP already contain unique “User_ID” for MSNP and 
would be holder of authentication and signing certificates. The users that are member 
of any social group would have an additional  social certificate stored in their ME or 
UICC issued by PKI using the procedure described in the previous section. The users 
should be able to 
 
 Perform mutual authentication with MSNP using AuthCert issued by the PKI 
using TLS handshake. 
 Access services of those social groups that he/she is already member off by 
using the login information as shown in Fig 14 or by using SocialCert after 
establishment of secure connection with MSNP. 
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Fig. 16: Online invitation flow initiated by moderator 
 
4.3.4 Online invitation to new members  
 
The procedure is shown in Fig. 16 and can be summarized as: 
 The moderator should securely perform mutual authentication with MSNP 
using the authentication certificate issued by PKI over HTTPS connection.  
 The moderator should have group access using database login or via social 
certificate of that particular group. 
 The moderator of the group can either explicitly invite new members using 
MSISDN or by searching the interface provided by the MSNP.  
 The entry of invited user would be updated in the database. 
 The same request of any registered but un-authorized user (not moderator of 
that specific social group) would be marked as invalid by the MSNP after 
validating “Role_ID” with “Group_ID” using MUSS as mentioned in the Fig 
14.  
 The MSNP will update its “tbl_invited_members” table as shown in Fig 14 
for that specific group and insert the ID‟s of the invited members.  
 The invitation request would be forwarded to the invited MSISDN via sms, 
voice mail etc. 
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 Users might show their intention to join some specific social network. Instead 
of starting complete authentication procedure, the notification will be passed 
on to the moderator to allow them to join group. 
 
Note: The notification to the moderator about the interested users is subject to 
security settings of that particular group adjusted by the moderator. By-default this 
feature would be disabled to eliminate the un-intended traffic towards moderator. 
4.3.5 Joining procedure for user invited in online mode 
 
The Master of one social network is entitled to allow/invite the other users to enter a 
group and create their appropriate profile which may vary from group to group 
depending on the settings and applications support in each group. The identification 
procedure for already registered client say „B‟ of MSNP can be defined as 
 
1) The invited users would request for security association via the MSNP plug-
in or MSNP client application already installed. The user authenticates itself 
using AuthCert_B. 
2) The MSNP will validate the client MSISDN as already registered user. The 
user request is mapped by database to confirm invitation status by the 
moderator and lifetime of request. 
3) The client will be routed to perform GBA based authentication and routing 
procedure as shown in Fig. 15 to generate new keys and update its 
SocialCert_B, containing group and role ID‟s of the new group.   
4) The MSNP will update the client status as member of that particular group. 
The joining procedure for online invited user that is not already registered with the 
MSNP would be slightly different and involves following steps: 
1) The invited user must access MSNP via UE (mobile equipment instead of 
online-interface) of MSNP to obtain certificates after completing GBA 
process. 
2) The user can register to MSNP by the procedure mentioned in Fig. 15 and 
obtain authentication and signing certificates from PKI. 
3) The user will repeat from step 2 to onwards for the joining procedure to 
specific group and obtaining social certificate. 
Note: An alternative approach would be to validate the invitation request by MSNP 
before starting GBA bootstrapping procedure to issue authentication and signing 
certificate to the new user. 
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4.3.6 New group creation by already registered members 
 
The registered users and MSNP can: 
 Securely perform mutual authentication using authentication certificate issued 
by PKI over HTTPS connection.  
 The user (regardless moderator or member) of group can opt to create new 
group by following the procedure mentioned in Fig. 15. The user and PKI 
must re-negotiate using GBA procedure to mutually authenticate and fetch 
session keys for updating the social certificate. 
 The MUSS in database for that specific group is updated and the client will 
store this updated social certificate into its local disk or UICC in case of 
GBA_U. 
4.4 Secure Identification in offline mode 
 
The offline communication for the MSNP can take following scenarios: 
 Both users are registered users of MSNP and hold authentication certificates 
(AuthCert). Moreover of the two users should be moderator of some social 
group and willing to invite the other user to join his/her closed group in the 
offline mode. 
 Both of the users have been already registered to the same group in MSNP 
and want to mutually authenticate each other in the offline mode using client 
application. 
4.4.1 Offline invitation by moderator to non-registered user of group 
 
The authentication flow for inviting a new member to MSNP and then client 
enrollment in MSNP database is depicted in Fig. 17. Suppose user A, who is 
moderator of group N want to invite user B who is registered user of MSNP for some 
other social network group. The steps in this procedure can be summarized as 
 
 Both parties will perform mutual authentication as shown in Fig. 17 using 
ViDP protocol [44] along with AuthCertA and AuthCertB respectively. 
 The user A will sign a special purpose "invitation structure", InvStruct_N 
(XML encoded) using the public key in SignCert_A. 
 The user A sends the invitation encrypted by MSNP public key containing 
 ID of group N 
 Role_ID (Assigned role of user within group N) 
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 Nonce (Time Stamp) 
  SignCert_A 
 The user B must have online communication with the MSNP prior to 
communicating with other members of the invited social network group to 
complete registration process and obtain its updated SocialCert_B from the 
network operator of MSNP. 
 Next time the user B is online, it authenticates itself with MSNP (using 
AuthCert_B) and present InvStruct_N to MSNP which is checked and 
verified by the MSNP. Next the MSNP will push user B for GBA bootstrap 
procedure as defined in 3GPP 33.223 specifications. 
 The PKI will complete GBA bootstrapping procedure with BSF over Ub 
interface and perform mutual authentication using Zn or Zn-proxy interface.  
 The user is added to the social network N database with specific role defined 
by user A and social certificate of user B (SocialCert_B) is updated to include 
group N with correct status and role of user B. 
 
UE
Authentication Using MANA
Certificate Sharing using InvStruct_N 
Validation of 
certificates using 
PKI public key 
UE
Validation of  
certificates using 
PKI public key 
Authentication Success/Failure
 
Fig. 17: Offline authentication procedure for non-registered users of particular group 
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4.4.2 Offline authentication of users belonging to same group 
 
The users who are already registered to same mobile social network within MSNP 
can authenticate each other by the following procedure: 
 
 Both parties will perform initial authentication using corresponding MSNP 
authentication certificates (AuthCert). 
 The users will then use social certificate (SocialCert) for verification and 
offline connectivity if the other party is part of that particular social group. 
The social certificate of each user will also determine its role within the 
group. 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter provides the solution that successfully encounters all the security 
requirements and problem definitions described in the previous chapters. The 
proposed design is fully in-compliance with GAA [3, 6 and 42] standards and related 
network elements, reference points along with proposed changes are discussed. The 
proposed design supports both online and the offline modes. The certificates details 
and their technical specifications are well-defined and the solution is illustrated by 
using diagrams to show all the steps required for enrollment, registration, 
authentication and invitation phases. The design is carefully worked out to be 
flexible for supporting numerous scenarios that are not related with cellular domain 
but still require secure identification. 
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5 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This section describes in detail about the implementation of secure identification 
using public, private key pairs and corresponding security certificates based on the 
solution discussed in previous chapter. The section also provides details about the 
offline communication and content sharing support among peers using sockets. 
Section 5.1 provides the architectural details and the platform used for 
implementation. Section 5.2 briefly summarizes about the software modules and 
Application Programming Interfaces (API‟s) of the functions used in prototype. 
Section 5.3 provides information about the basic security analysis of the 
implementation. Section 5.4 provides guidelines for the future implementation based 
on the outcomes and programming experience of current implementation. Finally, 
Section 5.5 describes the steps selected for final demonstration of the prototype. 
5.1 Prototype Structure 
 
The prototype implementation would be termed as thesis prototype in rest of the 
document and can be classified into online and offline mode. The online mode is 
primarily the simulation of the modified GBA process illustrated in Section 4.3 of 
this document. The offline mode is depicting the functionality explained in Section 
4.4 of this document. 
5.1.1 Prototype Platform 
 
The software and hardware requirements can be categorized as: 
5.1.1.1 Software Requirements 
 
Application Language: HTML, CSS, PHP 5.3 
Operating System: Windows, Linux 
Protocols:  HTTPS (SSL)  
Web Server:  Apache (2.2.11)  
Database:  MySQL 
5.1.1.2 Hardware Requirements 
 
All the cryptographic keys and certificates requests (CSR‟s) are generated at client 
end. The prototype server on the other hand is managing all the corresponding 
certificates along with its keys, database etc. Following hardware is recommended 
for the smooth execution of prototype especially at the client end while using 2048 
bit RSA keys.  
 
 X86 based Processor (Ideally Pentium Dual Dore or Compatible) 
 512 MB of minimum RAM 
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 1GB free space on storage 
5.1.2 Prototype Architecture 
 
The prototype architecture is shown in the diagram below 
 
HTTPS Tunnel
Server Side Scripting
Client 1 Client 2
Direct Socket Communication
Certificate Store
 
Fig. 18: Prototype Architecture 
5.2 Software Modules 
 
The prototype functionality is primarily based upon two software modules (API‟s) 
supported by PHP [53]. 
5.2.1 PHP Sockets 
 
According to [53], the PHP socket extension is primarily based on the most widely 
implemented BSD sockets interface. Although, majority of the functions have the 
identical names but the arguments differ in many functions.  
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) was chosen over the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) for client/server communication in offline mode due to its reliability.  
5.2.2 PHP OpenSSL Module 
 
OpenSSL module of the PHP uses OpenSSL [54] functions for confidentiality and 
integrity of data. The PHP support for OpenSSL is relatively new and quite un-
mature from programmer‟s point of view.  
The key pair generation, Certificate Signing Requests (CSR‟s), X.509 based 
certificates, data encryption, decryption, hashing and SSL based communication 
tunnel is supported by using various functions of this API. 
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5.3 Security Analysis 
 
The security of thesis prototype primarily depends on the access control mechanism 
to guard the key and certificate storage both at the client and server end. 
5.3.1 Secure Connectivity 
  
The complete connection setup and subsequent sessions are strongly authenticated 
and the complete communication is carried out in secure tunnel using SSL. The 
secure connectivity covers  
 User authentication in online mode 
 Server authentication by corresponding certificates 
 Access authentication in offline mode using ViDP [48] 
5.3.2 Potential Attack 
 
If the attacker is able to get hold of the user private key then it would be able to 
fabricate and get itself authenticated by the MSNP. 
5.3.2.1 Feasibility 
 
This attack is possible in case of 
 
 GBA_ME (As key pair is stored on local disk). Hence this attack is valid for 
the thesis prototype. 
 
This attack is not possible on UICC due to its tamper resistant nature. 
5.4 MSNP Prototype Recommendations 
 
The thesis prototype is the initial step towards the successful simulation of the 
solution proposed in the previous chapter. Hence, the prototype implementation is a 
mere elaboration of the solution and its practicality for MSNP portal. Thus, the 
experience learned during implementation may be useful to successfully realize the 
MSNP prototype. The limitations and recommendations for both offline and online 
mode are given below 
5.4.1 Server Mode 
 
The thesis prototype assumes that GBA process depicted in Fig. 15 is successfully 
carried out during registration of the new user and creation of new social group. The 
MSNP prototype should support all the functionality of GBA bootstrapping 
procedure. The process of integrating thesis prototype implementation can be 
achieved by extending it to support basic GBA functionality. One alternative way 
could be to extend the existing Ericsson GBA API [5] to support the functionality 
based on the results achieved within this thesis. 
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5.4.2 Client Mode 
 
The thesis prototype implementation affirms the need of Apache web server for all 
the clients in order to invoke the functions of the PHP Sockets [55] and PHP module 
of OpenSSL [56]. In current implementation, the client is an online or offline user 
accessing MSNP via desktop machine. The future enhancements as per requirements 
of the MSNP prototype can be divided into online and offline mode. 
5.4.2.1 Online Client Mode 
 
The current implementation is based on a client running Windows/Linux machine 
along with Apache web server. The real MSNP clients should be the mobile users 
running mobile based operating system like Android, Symbian etc. Hence the 
solution can be extended in two ways 
 There should be a client application for MSNP that supports the majority of 
the popular mobile operating system platforms.  
 Alternatively, a browser based plug-in can be introduced for all the main 
mobile based platforms. The plug-in should include functionality of 
generating keys, CSR‟s etc 
5.4.2.2 Offline Client Mode 
  
The clients in the thesis prototype interact directly with each other using PHP socket 
module. In order to successfully communicate, there should be an active network 
link and the clients should be able to ping each other prior to the connection requests. 
The MSNP mobile clients should be able to communicate via socket support of the 
mobile platform or by using Bluetooth. Another option is to implement this direct 
mode of operation via browser plugin as discussed in the previous section. 
5.4.2.3 USIM/ISIM 
 
The thesis prototype stores the key pairs and corresponding certificates on local 
storage of the client. This methodology can be followed for GBA_ME based clients. 
But in case of GBA_U, all the credentials should be stored and updated in 
USIM/ISIM so that the application/plug-in should be able to access these credentials. 
5.4.2.4 Access Control 
 
There is no access control mechanism devised for the security of key pairs, 
certificates etc. stored on the local disk drive. There should be well defined 
configuration steps to prevent leakage of secure credentials.  
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5.5 Demonstration 
 
The main goal of our demonstration is to illustrate and simulate secure identification 
between the UE and PKI portal managed by the MNO. The background of our demo 
includes a fictitious mobile social network MSNP running on server machine with 
three clients say A, B and C. The clients want to securely register and use MSNP 
with different roles. The prototype can be classified into five components and these 
are the available links in prototype left menu.  
 
1. Secure Registration (New users) 
2. New Social Group 
3. Online Invitation 
4. Offline Invitation 
5. Offline Authentication 
5.5.1 Secure Registration 
 
The steps involved in secure registration would be elaborated as 
1. User A will access the MSNP using the browser and providing the URL of 
MSNP. The TLS session would be setup between user and the MSNP. The 
User-A will select Secure Registration from the left menu. This will open a 
registration form. The user will provide MSISDN, and fills in other 
credentials required in the form and will press the submit button.  
2. Two public/private key pairs and two certificate requests (csr files) will be 
generated and all data (including registration details and certificate requests) 
would be sent to the server. The MSNP will successfully verify that User-A 
MSISDN is not already registered and would display error message in case of 
duplication. The MSNP will acquire User-A public keys from certificate 
requests (csr files) and would sign them using MSNP private key to generate 
authentication and signing certificates. The MSNP will prompt user to store 
corresponding authentication and signing certificates. The client would be 
displayed secure registration completion message. 
3. The User-B and User-C would repeat step number 1 to 2 for successfully 
creating other social groups. The User-B and User-C would sign-out from the 
prototype. 
5.5.2 New Social Group and Online Invitation 
 
The steps involved in creation of new social group and afterwards inviting other users to the 
corresponding group would be elaborated as 
1. The User-A would click on New Social Group link and the form will display 
two fields  
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a. Browse option to upload certificate. 
b. Check-box mentioning new social group 
2. The User-A will select check box „New Social Group‟ to upload its signing 
certificate and press login button. This will result in popup mentioning that 
the certificate is invalid. The user will repeat procedure and provide the 
authentication certificate and would be prompted to save its updated social 
certificate.  
3. The User-A will provide unique name for his/her group. MSNP would create 
social certificate which will include the Group ID, User ID and Role ID (user 
role within group i.e. moderator, member) of the social group. This file and 
its hash value would be encrypted using private key of the MSNP. The 
MSNP will prompt user to store corresponding social certificate. 
4. After the successful completion of registration and creating new social group, 
the User-A would click Online Invitation link in the menu. All the registered 
users would be shown in the grid and A would select User-B and send an 
invitation for joining his/her social group. The MSNP would update the 
database about this invitation and generate an e-mail to User-B about this 
invitation. The User-A would also upload some file at its social network 
page. The files size should be less than 1MB and this constraint would be 
verified during Demo. The User-A would be successfully signed out from the 
prototype. 
5. The User-B would click on Online Invitation link and click on ´Join Group´ 
option to authenticate itself using authentication certificate. The form will 
contain two fields  
a. Browse option to upload certificate. 
b. Drop down menu containing names of all social groups. 
6. The User-B will select group id of User-A social group and upload its signing 
certificate and press login button. This will result in popup mentioning that 
the certificate is invalid. The user will repeat procedure and provide the 
authentication certificate and would be prompted to save its updated social 
certificate. The User-B would be successfully logged into User-A social 
group and would see the file uploaded by User-A during step 4. 
7. The User-C would also repeat the step numbers 1 to 3 to create its new social 
group. Now all three users are registered members of MSNP and User-A and 
User-C are moderators of their social group. The User-B is not only 
moderator of his/her social group but also member of social group created by 
User-A. 
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5.5.3 Offline Authentication and Invitation 
 
The steps involved in offline authentication of two MSNP users belonging to different 
groups without mediation of the server would be elaborated as 
The steps involved in offline authentication demo for two users belonging to 
different groups would be: 
 
1. User-C will click on Offline Invitation option on the left menu and then press 
ready button to accept incoming connection. User-A will also select Offline 
Invitation but would press Connect button. The User-A would be prompted 
to enter “Hostname” or “IP Address” (or pre-configured in script) in the text 
box and click “Invite” or “Authenticate” button. The User-A will press 
“Invite” button. 
2. Both users would be displayed the sum calculated using ViDP protocol and 
prompted for verification that the value of sum is same on both sides. After 
successful verification, User-A will send invitation offer for C to join his/her 
group say „Social_A‟. The User-A will send its invitation vector encrypted by 
public key of MSNP containing 
 
a. ID of B 
b. ID of N 
c. Time stamp 
d. SignCert_A 
 
3. The User-C will present this vector to MSNP in online mode and would be 
issued updated social certificate. The User-C would also download the file 
available at „Social_A‟. 
 
The procedure for offline authentication between users of same social network can 
be: 
 
1. User-B will click on Offline Authentication option on the left menu and will 
click ready button to accept incoming connection. User-A will also select 
Offline Authentication but would select Connect button. The User-A would 
be prompted to enter “Hostname” or “IP Address” (or preconfigured within 
script) in the text box and click connect button. The User-A would be 
prompted to browse and upload the authentication and social certificates 
(AuthCert_A, SocialCert_B) stored on its disk.  
 
2. The User-B would be prompted to receive User-A authentication and social 
certificate. The User-B will click „yes‟ and verifies these certificates using 
public key of MSNP. Upon successful verification the User-B would be 
displayed successfully validated message. The User-B authentication and 
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social certificates would be send to User-A and same procedure will be 
replicated. 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter depicts the overall structure of the prototype implementation carried out 
for this particular thesis. Apart of the secure identification design presented in the 
previous chapter is successfully implemented. The prototype platform, architecture, 
software modules and API‟s used during implementation are concisely discussed. 
The initial security analysis is performed based on the lessons learned during 
prototype implementation. The verification process is also carried out and thoroughly 
discussed in the prototype demonstration.  Finally, detailed guidelines for future 
development are presented. 
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
  
6.1 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has highlighted necessary details and understanding about related tools 
and technologies deployed for mobile social networks and provides in-depth insight 
toward futuristic emerging trends. The concept of decentralized social networks and 
the security challenges related to these networks have been thoroughly covered. The 
research questions outlined in Section 1.3.3 are answered as follows: 
1. It has been discovered that there is a vast potential targeting high end customers 
requiring de-centralized closed social groups with assured security levels. 
Comprehensive study and research work is carried out to identify these use-cases 
and detailed analysis is carried out from business and technological point of 
view. 
2. The security requirements identified within this study could pave foundation for 
successful realization of secure mobile social network portal. The proposed 
design is in compliance of GAA [3, 6 and 42] standards by fulfilling the security 
requirements and can be adopted easily with minimal technical requirements. The 
Network Elements (NE), interfaces, cryptographic parameters and detailed 
procedures for authentication and key-exchange are also presented in the 3GPP 
specification format. 
3. The architecture for the secure identification to support Mobile Social Network 
Portal (MSNP) in both offline and online mode is thoroughly covered in Chapter 
4. We have chosen the certificate sharing mechanism for performing secure 
identification and authentication of a user. The device pairing protocol is used for 
initiating the session in offline mode and gaining trust over the potential 
compromised network. The certificates details and their technical specifications 
are well-defined and the solution is illustrated by using diagrams to show the 
necessary steps required for enrollment, registration, authentication and invitation 
phases.  
4. The design is carefully worked out to be flexible for supporting numerous 
scenarios that are not related with cellular domain but still require secure 
identification. The prototype implementation successfully demonstrates this fact 
and can be independently applied to any application demanding high security in 
terms of secure registration and authentication. 
The proposed identification model and experience learned during implementation 
have achieved artifacts upon which the succeeding work should be constructed.  To 
sum up, the thesis provides in depth answers to the research questions (section 1.3) 
and has achieved all the set forth objectives (section 1.4) along with concrete 
directions for the future work. 
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6.2 Future Work 
 
This study is the foundational project within SWIN [1] project and thus future work 
is the most promising aspect of this thesis. Most of the significant research directions 
for follow-up work have already been covered (section 5.4) including: 
- Extension of the Ericsson GBA API [5] to support the proposed design 
- Access control mechanism for the secure storage of certificates in case of 
GBA_ME 
Two interesting dimensions for the future work are the identity management and 
anonymity protection aspects for the mobile social network portal. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Screen Shots of Prototype 
 
The home screen of thesis prototype is shown in Figure A. 1. The page provides 
option for both online and offline authentication and new registration. 
 
 
Figure A. 1: Home screen of thesis prototype 
 
Generating Key pair:  
The information necessary for Certificate Signing Request is taken as input from the 
client as shown in Figure A. 2. 
 
 
Figure A. 2: Generation of key pairs and certificates signing requests 
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Public and private key Pairs and their corresponding Certificate Signing Requests 
(CSR‟s) are successfully generated as shown in the Figure A. 3.  
 
 
Figure A. 3: Download page for generated credentials 
 
The client can view and validate any of the key pairs and CSR‟s after clicking the 
“Download Here” option. The output after clicking the CSR request is shown in the 
Figure A. 4. 
 
 
Figure A. 4: Validating certificate request 
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Secure Registration Page: 
After successful generations of security credentials, the client completes secure 
registration process using CSR‟s as shown in the Figure A. 5. 
 
 
Figure A. 5: New user registration 
 
The client sends CSR requests to server along with registration information. The 
server signs CSR with its private key and sends corresponding authentication, 
signing certificates and the public key of the server. The certificates and keys can be 
viewed by clicking download here button as shown in the Figure A. 6. 
 
 
Figure A. 6: Validating certificates and server key after secure registration 
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After completing the secure registration step, the client may sign in to the prototype 
by using authentication certificate obtained in the previous step. As shown in Figure 
A. 7, we provided signing certificate instead of the authentication certificate for 
verification. Subsequently, it successfully provided error that it‟s not the 
authentication certificate. The verification is done at server end by extracting the 
keys from the certificate and validating them with keys stored in the database. The 
user can also view the server public key as shown in the Figure A. 8. 
 
 
Figure A. 7: Sign in page for registered user 
 
 
Figure A. 8: View via download option of server public key 
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After providing correct authentication certificate to the server, the users is 
authenticated and successfully sign-in to view the “New Social Group” and “Online 
Invitation” options in the left menu as shown in Figure A. 9. 
 
 
Figure A. 9: Page view after successful login 
 
New Social Group:  
The client will receive his/her first social certificate after this step. The certificate 
will be updated whenever the clients create a new group or become member of some 
other social group as shown in the Figure A. 10. 
 
 
Figure A. 10: Page for creation of new social group 
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Online Invitation: 
As shown in the Figure A. 11, the online user can view all the registered users of the 
MSNP. But the client would only be shown those groups where his/her profile is of 
group moderator. 
 
 
Figure A. 11: Online invitation page 
 
The procedure mentioned above is depicted in the Figure A. 12, as the moderator 
selects another user from the list and invite him/her to join group SICS. 
 
 
Figure A. 12: Inviting another user to your social group 
  71 
The invited user can validate the received invitation after logging with its 
authentication certificate and viewing the online invitation as shown in Figure A. 13. 
 
 
Figure A. 13: Validating online invitation request 
 
Offline Invitation: 
Two registered members of prototype can securely communicate with each other in 
offline mode using their authentication and signing certificates by using sockets as 
shown in the Figure A. 14.  
 
 
Figure A. 14: Creating offline connection via sockets 
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The avoid man in the middle attack; the offline communication is secured by 
implementing the ViDP protocol [48]. As per protocol architecture, both offline 
clients validate the shared cipher and its sum. Both users must press yes to validate 
the sum so that the invitation vector and signing certificate for invitation of social 
group is sent by one user to the other as shown in Figure A. 15. 
 
 
Figure A. 15: Validation of random numbers and sent vector using ViDP protocol 
 
The invited user can download the received security certificate and invitation vector 
as shown in the Figure A. 16. 
 
 
Figure A. 16: Validation of received certificate and invitation vector by other user 
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The invitation vector received by the invited user is encrypted to avoid tempering for 
fabricated use as shown in the Figure A. 17. 
 
 
Figure A. 17: Invitation vector in encrypted form 
 
The invited user can go online and present this invitation vector along with signing 
certificate of the group moderator to join the invited social group. User must upload 
the received signing certificate and invitation vector as shown in the Figure A. 18. 
 
 
Figure A. 18: Getting online and joining social group via offline invitation 
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Finally, the user will be successfully enrolled to the group whom invitation was 
received during offline communication using ViDP [48] via socket interface as 
shown in the Figure A. 19. 
 
 
Figure A. 19: Successful membership via credentials received in offline mode 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  75 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[1] Social Wireless Networks, Secure Identification (SWIN Project), [Online]. 
Available: http://www.sics.se/projects/swin 
[2] Timo Olkkonen, “Generic Authentication Architecture,” Seminar on Network 
Security at Helsinki University of Technology, TKK T-110.5290, 2006  
[3] 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects; 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System 
description, version 9.1.0, Release 9, 3GPP, TR 33.919, June 2010. 
[4] Yuh-Min Tseng, “USIM-based EAP-TLS authentication protocol for wireless 
local area networks,” Computer Standards & Interfaces, vol. 31, pp. 128-136, 2009 
[5] Ericsson Labs, [Online]. Available: https://labs.ericsson.com/apis/mobile-web-
security-bootstrap/ 
[6] 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects; 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic 
bootstrapping architecture, version 9.3.0, Release 9, 3GPP, TS 33.220, June 2010. 
[7] Pew Internet and American Life Project, [Online]. Available: 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1652/social-relations-online-experts-predict-future 
[8] OpenID, [Online]. Available: http://openid.net/ 
[9] Alexa Top 500 Global Sites, [Online]. Available: http://www.alexa.com/topsites 
[Accessed August, 2010] 
[10] myChurch, [Online]. Available: http://www.mychurch.org/ [Accessed August, 
2010] 
[11] Muxlim, [Online]. Available: http://muxlim.com/ [Accessed August, 2010] 
[12] PartnerUp, [Online]. Available: http://www.partnerup.com/ [Accessed August, 
2010] 
[13] Ryze Business,[Online]. Available: http://www.ryze.com/ [Accessed August, 
2010] 
[14] Ning, [Online]. Available: http://www.ning.com/ [Accessed August, 2010] 
[15] M.Handley, H. Schulzrinne, E. Schooler and J. Romberg., “Session initiation 
protocol," IETF RFC 2543, Available: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2543.txt , March 
1999 
[16] ITU-T Recommendation H.264, “Advanced video coding for generic 
audiovisual services,” Available: http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264-201003-I/en  
[17] ITU-T Recommendation H.263, “Video coding for low bitrate communication,” 
Available: http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.263-200501-I/en  
  76 
[18] F. Dowsen, D. Stenerson., “Internet Calendaring and Scheduling Core Object 
Specification (iCalendar),” RFC 2445, Available: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2445.txt , 
November 1998 
[19] ArticlesBase, [Online]. Available: http://www.articlesbase.com/internet-
articles/history-of-social-networking-websites-1908457.html 
[20] GIGaom, [Online]. Available: http://gigaom.com/2010/04/12/mary-meeker-
mobile-internet-will-soon-overtake-fixed-internet/ 
[21] GyPSii, [Online]. Available: http://www.gypsii.com/ [Accessed August, 2010] 
[22] Brightkite, [Online]. Available: http://brightkite.com/ [Accessed August, 2010] 
[23] Loopt, [Online]. Available: http://www.loopt.com/ [Accessed August, 2010] 
[24] P. Calhoun et al.,”Diameter Base Protocol,” IETF RFC 3588, Available: 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3588.html, September 2003 
[25] BrightKite Profile at Crunchbase, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.crunchbase.com/company/brightkite [Accessed August, 2010] 
[26] Loopt Profile at CrunchBase, http://www.crunchbase.com/company/loopt 
[Accessed August, 2010] 
[27] I. Chlamtac, M. Conti, J. Liu, “Mobile ad hoc networking: imperatives and 
challenges,” Ad Hoc Networks 1 (1) (2003) 13–64 
[28] L. Venkatraman, D.P. Agrawal, “Strategies for enhancing routing security in 
protocols for mobile ad hoc networks,” Journal of Parallel and Distributed 
computing, vol. 63, pp. 214-227, 2003 
[29] Rongxing Lu, Zenfo Cao, Licheng Wang, Congkai Sun, “A Secure Routing 
Protocol with authenticated key exchange for ad hoc networks,” Computer Standards 
and Interfaces, vol. 29, pp. 521-527, 2007. 
[30] M. Jakobsson, K. Sako, R. Impagliazzo, “Designated verifier proofs and their 
applications,” Ueli Maurer (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'96, LNCS, 
vol. 1070, pp. 143-154, Springer-Verlag, 1996 
[31] J. Kohl, C. Neuman, “The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5),” 
IETF RFC 1510, Available: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1510.txt , September 1993 
[32] Asad Amir Pirzada and Chris McDonald, “Kerberos Assisted Authentication in 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” 27th Australian Computer Science Conference, pp. 41-46, 
2004 
[33] Nikos Komninos, Dimitrios D. Vergados, Christos Douligeris, “Authentication 
in a layered security approach for mobile ad hoc networks,” ELSEVIER computers & 
security, Vol. 2 6, pp. 373-380, 2007 
  77 
[34] T. Xu and Y. Cai, “Location anonymity in continuous location-based services,” 
Proceeding of the 15
th
 International Symposium on Advances in Geographic 
Information Systems (ACM GIS), pp. 1-8, 2007 
[35] T. Xu and Y. Cai, “Exploring historical location data for anonymity preservation 
in location based services.” Proceedings of the IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 1220-1228, 
2008 
[36] Windows CardSpace, [Online]. Available: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa480189.aspx 
[37] VIP, [Online]. Available: http://www.verisign.com/authentication/ [Accessed 
August, 2010] 
[38] David Recordon, Drummond Reed,”OpenID 2.0: A Platform for User-Centric 
Identity Management,” DIM’06, November 3, 2006, Alexandria, Virginia, USA. 
Copyright 2006 ACM 1-59593-547-9/06/0011 
[39] Hyun-Kyung Oh, Seung-Hun Jin,”The Security Limitations of SSO in OpenID,” 
ICACT, pp. 1608-1611, 2008, ISBN: 978-89-5519-136-3 
[40] HwanJin Lee, InKyung Jeun, Kilsoo Chun, Junghwan Song, “A New Anti-
Phishing Method in OpenID,” The Second International Conference on Emerging 
Security Information, Systems and Technologies, pp.243-247, IEEE 2008 
[41] A. Niemi, J.Arkko, V.Torvinen., “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest 
Authentication Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA),” IETF RFC 3310, 
Available: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3310 , September 2001 
[42] 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects; 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support 
for subscriber certificates, version 9.1.0, Release 9, 3GPP, TS 33.221, June 2010. 
[43] OMA Security: “Wireless Identity Module,” Part: Security, version 1.2, 2005 
[44] PKCS #10; Certification Request Syntax Standard [Online]. Available FTP: 
ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-10/pkcs-10v1_7.pdf  
[45] C. Ellison and B. Schneier, “Risks of PKI: Electronic Commerce,” 
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 43(2), 2000 
[46] Dwaine E. Clarke, “SPKI/SDSI HTTP Server / Certificate Chain Discovery in 
SPKI/SDSI,” Master thesis in Computer Science and Engineering at MIT (USA), 
September, 2001. 
[47] C. Gehrmann, C. Mitchell, and K. Nyberg, “Manual Authentication for Wireless 
Devices,” RSA Cryptobytes, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 29–37, 2004 
[48] D. Zisiadis, S. Kopsidas and Leandros Tassiulas, "ViDPSec Visual Device 
Pairing Security Protocol," International Conference on Computational Science and 
Engineering, Vol. 3, pp.359-364, 2009 
  78 
[49] T. Dierks, C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” IETF RFC 2246, 
Available: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246 , January 1999 
[50] S. Blake-Wilson, M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen, T. Wright., 
“Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions,” IETF RFC 4366, Available: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4366 , April 2006 
[51] XML Encryption Systax and Processing, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/ 
[53] PHP Hypertext Preprocessor, [Online]. Available: http://php.net/ 
[54] The Open Source Toolkit for SSL/TLS, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.openssl.org/ 
[55] The Apache, HTTP Server Project, [Online]. Available: http://httpd.apache.org 
[56] Open Source Database, [Online]. Available: http://www.mysql.com 
